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When a 21-year-old man was shot and killed by the Los
Angeles police in 2008, his family members sued the city.1 They
claimed that the county coroner had failed to notify the family of
their relative’s death in a timely fashion and prevented them from
burying him in accordance with their religion, causing the family
members to suffer emotional pain.2 The U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit held in 2014 that the family members had
standing to bring this claim—not as representatives of the man’s
estate, but on their own behalf—since they had suffered “emotional
harm (injury in fact).”3
In 1995, the D.C. Circuit reviewed a suit brought by the
Humane Society against the Secretary of the Interior for
exempting an Asian elephant from restrictions on transferring
certain endangered species abroad.4 One of the plaintiffs’ claims
was that they would no longer be able to visit the elephant at the
zoo—a state of affairs that had caused them to “suffer[ ] severe
distress,” including “sleeplessness, depression, and anger.”5 The
court responded that “general emotional ‘harm,’ no matter how
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1 Chaudhry v. City of Los Angeles, 751 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2014). The family
alleged that 21 days had elapsed between their relative’s death and the notification of
his family. See id. at 1100.
2 Id. at 1100, 1109.
3 Id. at 1109.
4 Humane Soc’y of the U.S. v. Babbitt, 46 F.3d 93 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
5 Id. at 98.
1556 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81:4
deeply felt, cannot suffice for injury-in-fact for standing purposes.”6
The court ultimately held that the plaintiffs lacked standing.7
Individual Catholics and a Catholic advocacy organization
in San Francisco challenged San Francisco’s adoption of a
resolution criticizing the Catholic Church’s stance on adoption by
same-sex couples.8 The “[p]laintiffs allege[d] that their ‘Sacred
Scripture’ ‘presents homosexual acts as acts of grave depravity’”
and that “the resolution conveys a government message of
disapproval and hostility towards their religious beliefs,” a
message that portrayed them as “outsiders, not full members of
the political community.”9 The Ninth Circuit found in 2010 that
the plaintiffs had standing because they had suffered “spiritual or
psychological harm.”10
These cases differ in many ways, but they all present the
question of whether psychological harm can or should serve as a
basis for constitutional standing. The Supreme Court has
interpreted Article III’s “case or controversy” language to impose
certain limitations on the class of plaintiffs whose claims can be
heard by federal courts.11 An especially important limitation is the
requirement of “injury-in-fact.” To have constitutional standing, a
plaintiff must show an “invasion of a legally protected interest”
that is “concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent, not
‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical.’”12 This injury must, in turn, be
“fairly traceable to the defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct and
likely to be redressed by the requested relief.”13
The injury-in-fact requirement—along with standing
doctrine more broadly—has been justified on the grounds that it
promotes the separation of powers by restraining the federal
courts in relation to the legislative and executive branches of
government, including by protecting the executive branch’s
distinctive enforcement role;14 that it prevents the federal courts
6 Id. The D.C. Circuit stated, however, that “no court has yet considered
whether an emotional attachment to a particular animal (not owned by a plaintiff) based
upon the animal being housed in a particular location could form the predicate of a
claim of injury.” Id.
7 The D.C. Circuit noted that “it is difficult for us to see how the [Humane]
Society’s injury claim may be brought within standing precedent” but concluded that
even if the plaintiff could show injury, it could not satisfy the other aspects of the
standing inquiry. Id. at 99.
8 Catholic League for Religious & Civil Rights v. City & County of San
Francisco, 624 F.3d 1043 (9th Cir. 2010).
9 Id. at 1052-53.
10 Id. at 1050.
11 See, e.g., Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559-60 (1992).
12 Id. at 560 (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990)).
13 Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).
14 See, e.g., id. at 750, 761.
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from being flooded with claims;15 and that it ensures an
adversarial presentation of legal issues.16 The injury-in-fact
requirement has been challenged just as vociferously on the
grounds that, for example, it is applied in an arbitrary manner
that merely reflects judges’ substantive views of a case’s merits; it
unduly disfavors beneficiaries of government regulatory programs;
and it lacks a genuine basis in Article III.17
Love it or hate it, the injury-in-fact requirement has
become an increasingly significant gatekeeper to the federal
courts over the past several decades. This article takes up the
question of whether and how psychological harm can and should
open these gates. Thus far, the Supreme Court has not directly
analyzed the cognizability of psychological harm as injury-in-fact.18
In the recently decided case Spokeo v. Robins, the Supreme Court
confirmed that “intangible injuries can nevertheless be concrete”
and cognizable as Article III injury-in-fact.19 But the question
remains whether and when psychological harms—which are
not equivalent to the harms involving the dissemination of
inaccurate information at issue in Spokeo—can constitute
Article III injury as well.
The idea that certain intangible injuries can count for
Article III standing is by no means novel. The Supreme Court has
stated in the past that “non-economic injury” is cognizable;20 in
particular, the Court has shown a willingness to recognize injury
to aesthetic and conservational interests,21 a “spiritual stake in
First Amendment values,”22 the “inability to compete on an
15 See Amnesty Int’l USA v. Clapper, 638 F.3d 118, 132 n.15 (2d Cir. 2011)
(“Standing has been said to serve a number of other values, as well, including: promoting
judicial efficiency and effectiveness by preventing the courts from being overwhelmed with
cases where plaintiffs have only an ideological stake . . . .”), rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013).
16 See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church
& State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1972).
17 For a helpful account of such critiques, see Heather Elliott, The Functions
of Standing, 61 STAN. L. REV. 459, 466, 501-07 (2008); see also William A. Fletcher, The
Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 221-22 (1988); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Justice
Scalia, Standing, and Public Law Litigation, 42 DUKE L.J. 1141, 1168 (1993); Cass R.
Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article III, 91
MICH. L. REV. 163, 186-91 (1992).
18 Cf. Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1121 (10th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he Supreme
Court has not provided clear and explicit guidance on the difference between psychological
consequence from disagreement with government conduct and noneconomic injury that is
sufficient to confer standing.”).
19 Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016).
20 See Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 486; Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs.,
Inc. v. Camp (ADAPSO), 397 U.S. 150, 154 (1970).
21 Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S.
167, 183 (2000); ADAPSO, 397 U.S. at 154.
22 ADAPSO, 397 U.S. at 154.
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equal footing,”23 and—possibly—stigma or indignity as bases of
Article III injury.24 Recognition of these intangible injuries
leaves open the question of whether psychological effects on
plaintiffs, stemming from either intangible or tangible injuries,
could ground a viable injury-in-fact claim. But it is worth noting
that the harmful nature of these intangible injuries seems to stem
at least partially from their psychological effects on plaintiffs. All
this suggests that the Supreme Court has not precluded the
recognition of psychological harm as injury-in-fact.
At the same time, the Supreme Court has indicated that
the “psychological consequence presumably produced by
observation of conduct with which one disagrees”25 cannot
constitute injury-in-fact, and the Court has been especially
concerned with preventing the federal courts from becoming
forums for the adjudication of the “generalized grievances” that
could arise when any citizen is psychologically affected by
government action.26 In addition, the Court’s statement that a
future injury must be “certainly impending”27 raises questions
about whether and when the particular emotions of fear or
anxiety about future harm could count as injury-in-fact. Some
Justices had previously expressed an interest in going further in
resisting psychological harm as a basis for standing; in an
Establishment Clause case, Justice Scalia wrote a concurrence,
joined by Justice Thomas, urging the Court to reject “Psychic
Injury” as injury-in-fact, and objecting to the “conceptualizing of
injury in fact in purely mental terms.”28
Accordingly, the Supreme Court’s confirmation in Spokeo
that intangible harm may constitute injury-in-fact renders all the
more salient the issue of whether, and under what conditions,
23 Ne. Fla. Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors v. City of Jacksonville,
508 U.S. 656, 666 (1993).
24 See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 755-56, 757 n.22 (1984). The Court in
Allen v. Wright indicated that a plaintiff could assert a claim of stigmatic injury based
on being “personally subject to discriminatory treatment,” id. at 757 n.22 (citing
Heckler v. Matthews, 465 U.S. 728, 739-40 (1984)), but that the plaintiffs in Allen had
alleged only an “abstract stigmatic injury,” which was not judicially cognizable. See id.
at 755-56; see also infra Section II.A.3.
25 Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 485.
26 See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573-74 (1992); Valley Forge,
454 U.S. at 483.
27 Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1143 (2013) (quoting Whitmore
v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990)). Clapper left open the possibility that standing could
be found based on a “substantial risk” that the anticipated harm would occur. Id. at 1150
n.5; see also Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2341 (2014) (“An
allegation of future injury may suffice if the threatened injury is ‘certainly impending,’
or there is a ‘“substantial risk” that the harm will occur.’” (quoting Clapper, 133 S. Ct.
at 1147, 1150 n.5)).
28 Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 619-20 (2007)
(Scalia, J., concurring).
2016] PSYCHOLOGICAL HARM AND CONSTITUTIONAL STANDING 1559
psychological effects on plaintiffs could constitute injury-in-fact.29
As of now, it seems that the Supreme Court has left open the
door to claims of psychological harm as a general matter, while
refusing to count as injury-in-fact certain types of psychological
harm, such as harms that are overly abstract or “hypothetical”
or insufficiently “particularized” or “concrete.”30 Beyond these
broad statements, there is a lack of clarity about the circumstances
under which psychological harm could create standing, and a
dearth of legal analysis as to the circumstances, if any, under
which psychological harm should create standing. Lower federal
courts have offered a variety of illuminating and divergent
approaches to psychological harm’s place in standing doctrine.
However, these courts generally do not explicitly tackle the
conundrums raised by the possibility of recognizing psychological
harm as injury-in-fact or articulate criteria by which cognizable
claims of psychological harm could be distinguished from
noncognizable ones. Courts seem caught between the recognition
that psychological harm “in fact” causes genuine damage to
citizens and may also be an aspect of already-established Article
III injuries, on the one hand, and trepidation about the
possibility of opening the floodgates to hurt feelings of every
variety, on the other.
Against this background, the current article provides an in-
depth analysis of the role of psychological harm in constitutional
standing doctrine. It argues for the explicit recognition of
psychological harm as injury-in-fact, coupled with restrictions on
the cognizability of this type of harm. More specifically, this article
contends that psychological harm should be cognizable as injury-in-
fact for the following reasons. First, recognizing psychological harm
would reflect an acknowledgement that this form of harm can
genuinely and seriously affect citizens’ lives—or that psychological
29 In fact, during oral argument for Spokeo v. Robins in November 2015, some
questioning from the Justices appeared to contemplate the possibility that psychological or
emotional harm could be an Article III injury. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 6, 9,
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, No. 13-1339 (Nov. 2, 2015) (Justice Breyer to Spokeo’s counsel:
“You said it could be psychic harm, there could be economic harm, there could be all
different kinds of harm.” Justice Kagan: “if somebody did it to me, [i.e., disseminated
false information about me] I’d feel harmed”). Neither of these Justices clearly
endorsed the suggestion that psychological harm sufficed for injury-in-fact, and the
term “feel” in Justice Kagan’s statement does not necessarily denote psychological
harm. But the questions seemed to treat as a live possibility the notion that mental
harm could form a predicate for standing. Notably, in his amended complaint, respondent
Thomas Robins had asserted that he suffered “actual harm in the form of anxiety, stress,
concern, and/or worry about his diminished employment prospects.” Amended Complaint at
8, Robins v. Spokeo, No. 10-cv-5306 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 17, 2011) (ECF No. 40).
30 Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1147; Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61; Allen v. Wright, 468
U.S. 737, 750 (1984).
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harm may be “concrete.”31 Second, such recognition would accord
with one of the bases for constitutional standing doctrine: the
adverse presentation of legal issues in a way that enhances
comprehension of the stakes of judicial action. Since the specific
factual dimensions of a legal dispute include litigants’ psychological
experiences, recognizing psychological harm as injury-in-fact can
deepen and enrich the adjudicative process. Third, certain
nonpecuniary or nonphysical injuries such as “aesthetic injury”
and a “spiritual stake in First Amendment values” have been
accepted as injury-in-fact, and it would be arbitrary to accept
these injuries while excluding psychological harm, especially
since the injuries caused by these intangible harms are frequently
felt primarily in the psychological realm. In light of these
considerations, justifications for standing doctrine based on the
separation of powers and the limited role of the federal judiciary
should motivate not a rejection of psychological harm as injury-in-
fact, but a focus on how courts can differentiate cognizable from
noncognizable claims.
Accordingly, this article argues, psychological harm ought
to be cognized as injury-in-fact for Article III purposes when two
conditions are met. First, the harm must be a response to the
alleged invasion of a legally protected interest (constitutional,
statutory, or common law). Second, there must be a sufficient
nexus between the alleged legal violation and the circumstances
of the particular plaintiff, so that it is reasonable to think that
such a plaintiff would be especially likely to suffer psychological
harm in the situation at hand.
The first condition is meant to ensure that courts can
distinguish in a principled way between psychological harm
resulting from actions or circumstances that the law censures
from those that the law does not. For instance, psychological
harm resulting from segregated public school systems would
meet this criterion, while a person’s devastation at not being
able to attend a segregated public school, however deeply felt,
would not. The second condition involves a particularity inquiry
that draws on principles of tort law—an area in which courts
have important reserves of experience dealing with psychological
harm. In adjudicating whether there is a sufficiently tight nexus
between the legal violation and the specific plaintiff alleging
psychological harm, courts could consider such issues as the
relationship between the plaintiff and another entity (such as a
person or an animal) whose injuries give rise to the plaintiff ’s
31 In Spokeo, the Supreme Court emphasized the need for injury-in-fact, even
intangible injury, to be “concrete.” See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016).
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psychological harm, the plaintiff ’s physical proximity to the
source of psychological harm, and the longevity of the
plaintiff ’s connection to the situation from which the harm
arises. For example, the family members of the man killed in
Los Angeles would be more likely to state a cognizable claim of
psychological harm than an unrelated individual, and the
Catholic advocacy group challenging San Francisco’s ordinance
would have a better chance of showing injury-in-fact if the
particular plaintiffs lived in San Francisco. The particularity
inquiry responds both to evidentiary concerns about how
plaintiffs can show they have suffered psychological harm and
to the issue of imposing a limiting principle on the cognizability
of psychological harm.
More generally, the article takes existing standing
doctrine seriously while promoting innovation within that
framework. It does not foreclose broader critiques of the injury-in-
fact requirement, such as the view that the standing inquiry is
not independent of the question of whether a plaintiff has a cause
of action.32 Indeed, the article marshals certain critiques of the
injury-in-fact requirement to support its claims. For example, the
article responds to the objection that its proposed particularity
inquiry would license an undue expansion of judicial discretion by
arguing that the injury-in-fact doctrine already asks courts to
exercise discretion; the question is whether courts will do so in a
clear and structured way. At the same time, this article remains
tethered to standing doctrine as it has developed over the past
several decades, in an effort to advance a proposal grounded in
the case law. So, for instance, the article turns to previously
decided cases for insight and synthesizes certain aspects of
current doctrine while downplaying other strands. Engagement
with existing standing jurisprudence is meant to advance a kind
of “reflective equilibrium”33 between courts’ approaches to the
topic and more general normative principles.
Many scholars have discussed the origins and development
of current Article III standing doctrine, especially the role of
32 See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 17, at 232-33, 290-91 (arguing that “the
nature and degree of injury . . . cannot be seen as a merely ‘factual’ question. Rather, it
must be seen as part of the question of the nature and scope of the substantive legal
right on which plaintiff relies,” and “[i]n seeking to determine whether a particular
plaintiff has standing, we should ask, as a question of law on the merits, whether the
plaintiff has the right to enforce the particular legal duty in question”); Sunstein, supra
note 17, at 166 (“[A]n ‘injury in fact’ . . . is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition
for standing. The relevant question is instead whether the law—governing statutes, the
Constitution, or federal common law—has conferred on the plaintiffs a cause of action.”).
33 For a classic use of the term “reflective equilibrium,” see JOHN RAWLS, A
THEORY OF JUSTICE 43-44 (2009). The term is not used here in any technical sense.
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“injury-in-fact.”34 Frequently, these writers have criticized courts’
inconsistent treatment of standing cases. While such articles
offer rich analyses of constitutional standing doctrine and its
difficulties, they do not concentrate on the issue of psychological
harm as injury-in-fact—the main purpose of this article. Other
pieces have dealt with concepts related to psychological harm,
such as expressive harm, as part of the merits of a case rather
than as standing questions.35 While their insights can help to
inform the analysis here, this article instead focuses on the
question of how plaintiffs can open the federal courthouse
doors, not what they may argue once they arrive inside. Within
the literature on constitutional standing doctrine, a smaller
number of contributions have raised issues more specifically
related to psychological harm, including expressive harm, stigmatic
harm, and standing based on fear of future events.36 This article
34 See, e.g., Elliott, supra note 17; F. Andrew Hessick, Standing, Injury in
Fact, and Private Rights, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 275 (2008); Richard Murphy, Abandoning
Standing: Trading a Rule of Access for a Rule of Deference, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 943 (2008).
William Fletcher and Cass Sunstein have famously criticized courts for instituting a
hurdle of “injury-in-fact” beyond a focus on “the nature and scope of the substantive
legal right on which plaintiff relies” or the requirement that plaintiffs allege a viable
cause of action. See Fletcher, supra note 17, at 232-33; Sunstein, supra note 17, at 166-
67. Other scholars have offered analyses that aim to provide more consistent
justifications for the Court’s standing doctrine. Eugene Kontorovich, for example, has
presented an account of standing as a mechanism to prevent “inefficient disposition of
constitutional entitlements.” Eugene Kontorovich, What Standing Is Good For, 93 VA.
L. REV. 1663, 1664, 1666 (2007). Richard Re has suggested that courts grant standing
on a relative basis, depending on which plaintiffs have the most at “stake in obtaining
a particular remedy.” Richard M. Re, Relative Standing, 102 GEO. L.J. 1191, 1204 (2014).
Richard Fallon has recently provided a rich discussion of standing in the Roberts Court
against the background of the doctrine’s historical development. See Richard H. Fallon,
Jr., The Fragmentation of Standing, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1061, 1064-67 (2015).
35 E.g., Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion
in Criminal Law, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 351 (1996) (discussing the role of emotion in
criminal law and noting that the “expressive theory of punishment” conceives of both
criminal actions and criminal punishment as expressing certain societal values and
meanings); Corinne Blalock, Hollingsworth v. Perry: Expressive Harm and the Stakes
of “Marriage,” 8 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y SIDEBAR 217 (2012) (analyzing the
topic of “expressive harm” in the context of legal disputes over same-sex marriage).
36 See, e.g., Carl H. Esbeck, Unwanted Exposure to Religious Expression by
Government: Standing and the Establishment Clause, 7 CHARLESTON L. REV. 607
(2013) (discussing standing for plaintiffs bringing Establishment Clause–based claims
grounded on unwanted exposure to religious expression); Thomas Healy, Stigmatic
Harm and Standing, 92 IOWA L. REV. 417, 448 (2007) (arguing that stigmatic harm
should be recognized as a basis for Article III standing); Vicki C. Jackson, Standing
and the Role of Federal Courts: Triple Error Decisions in Clapper v. Amnesty
International USA and City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 127,
137 (2014) (providing a critique of some key standing cases, with a focus on cases that
speak to the cognizability of future injury, in light of the federal courts’ role in
protecting rights not adequately vindicated by majoritarian political processes); Seth F.
Kreimer, “Spooky Action at a Distance”: Intangible Injury in Fact in the Information
Age, 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 745 (2016) (investigating the relationship between standing
law’s treatment of intangible injury, including aesthetic injury and spiritual injury,
and the status of harms stemming from the use or misuse of information); Jonathan
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draws on several illuminating points made in these contributions
while going further by focusing squarely on psychological harm
and standing, widening the lens to consider a broader range of
cases and doctrines (especially from the federal circuit and
district courts),37 and advancing a proposal for courts to
distinguish cognizable from noncognizable claims.
Part I of this article begins by discussing the definition
of psychological harm and its relationship to concepts such as
aesthetic, expressive, and reputational injury. The article then
moves on to a critical analysis of existing doctrine on
psychological harm and constitutional standing, highlighting
live questions in the courts’ treatment of this subject and
indicating the need for a clearer, more consistent approach.
Part II presents a framework for the treatment of psychological
Krieger, Emotions and Standing for Animal Advocates After APSCA v. Ringling Bros.
& Barnum & Bailey Circus, 22 LAW & INEQ. 385 (2004) (arguing for standing based on
emotional injury in cases involving the treatment of animals); William P. Marshall &
Gene R. Nichol, Not a Winn-Win: Misconstruing Standing and the Establishment
Clause, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 215, 232 (2011) (arguing that “protecting taxpayers from
the ‘psychic’ harm of being compelled to support religion to which they do not adhere is
a central substantive Establishment Clause concern”); Richard H. Pildes & Richard G.
Niemi, Expressive Harms, “Bizarre Districts,” and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-
District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483, 513-15 (1993)
(discussing the view that racially conscious redistricting could give rise to
constitutionally cognizable expressive harms); Cass R. Sunstein, Standing for Animals
(with Notes on Animal Rights), 47 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1333 (2000) (analyzing standing in
the animal welfare context); Daniel J. Austin, Comment, How to Reconcile the
Establishment Clause and Standing Doctrine in Religious Display Cases with a New
Coercion Test, 83 MISS. L.J. 605 (2014) (proposing a test to evaluate standing to
challenge religious displays as violations of the Establishment Clause); Note,
Expressive Harms and Standing, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1313 (1999) (analyzing standing in
cases of expressive harm and suggesting inconsistencies in the Supreme Court’s
treatment of this subject); Brian Calabrese, Note, Fear-Based Standing: Cognizing an
Injury-in-Fact, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1445 (2011) (investigating the topic of standing
based on fear, including “chilling effect” injury, fear about enforcement of a statute, and
fear based on anticipated harm); Andrew Meyer, Comment, Barnes-Wallace v. City of
San Diego: “Psychological Injury” and Its Effect on Standing, 44 J. MARSHALL L. REV.
507 (2011) (arguing that the Supreme Court should clarify that psychological injury
does not suffice for standing); Ashley C. Robson, Note, Measuring a “Spiritual Stake”:
How to Determine Injury-In-Fact in Challenges to Public Displays of Religion, 81
FORDHAM L. REV. 2901 (2013) (considering the standing issues raised by challenges to
public displays of religious symbols, as well as the standards used to adjudicate such
claims); see also Andy Hessick, Zivotofsky and Spokeo, by Andy Hessick, NOTICE &
COMMENT: A BLOG FROM THE YALE J. ON REG. (May 18, 2015), http://www.yalejreg.com/
blog/zivotofsky-and-spokeo-by-andy-hessick [http://perma.cc/5ZM5-SP4D] (commenting on
whether emotional harm could suffice for standing in the context of Zivotofsky ex rel.
Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015), a challenge to the State Department’s decision
not to put “Israel” on the passport of Zivotofsky, an American citizen born in Jerusalem);
William Baude, The Legal Power of ‘Standing,’ N.Y. TIMES (May 14, 2015), http://www.ny
times.com/2015/05/14/opinion/the-legal-power-of-standing.html [http://perma.cc/74TE-QQ
G4] (discussing the issue of whether Zivotofsky had standing on the basis of
expressive harm).
37 See the Appendix for a number of cases that shed light on the topic of
psychological harm and standing, as well as cases on related types of harms (for example,
aesthetic and reputational harm).
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harm as injury-in-fact. It describes both the reasons for courts
to cognize psychological harm explicitly and the need for
limitations on psychological harm’s cognizability. Part II also
fleshes out the proposal by considering the relationship
between the article’s approach to injury-in-fact and other
threshold matters governing plaintiffs’ access to the federal
courts, including the causation and redressability prongs of
constitutional standing doctrine; the question of whether the
article’s proposal would render psychological harm superfluous
because the violation of a legally protected interest would be the
feature that actually created standing; and the issue of whether the
article’s proposal licenses an undue expansion of judicial discretion.
I. PSYCHOLOGICALHARM AS INJURY-IN-FACT: THE
CURRENT LANDSCAPE
A. Defining Psychological Harm
How should we understand the term “psychological
harm” in the context of constitutional standing doctrine? Neither
courts nor scholarly commentators have engaged deeply with
the question of what counts as psychological harm or how
psychological harm relates to concepts such as expressive,
emotional, or aesthetic harm, or the ideas of offense or insult.
The absence of any accepted understanding adds to the difficulty
of pinning down the doctrine in this area and identifying points
of agreement and disagreement among courts.
For instance, courts that decline to cognize injuries
related to plaintiffs’ mental or emotional states sometimes
refer to “purely psychological”38 harm or “mere psychological
discomfort,”39 while courts that cognize psychological harm
drop adjectives like “purely” and “mere.”40 What then is the
distinction between “mere” psychological harm and psychological
harm per se, and what might be needed in addition to “mere”
psychological harm in order for injury-in-fact requirements to
be satisfied? Courts frequently group together psychological
38 E.g., United States v. All Funds on Deposit with R.J. O’Brien & Assocs.,
783 F.3d 607, 616 (7th Cir. 2015); Family & Children’s Ctr. v. Sch. City of Mishawaka,
13 F.3d 1052, 1058 (7th Cir. 1994).
39 E.g., Freedom From Religion Found., Inc. v. Zielke, 845 F.2d 1463, 1468
n.3 (7th Cir. 1988); see also Humane Soc’y of the U.S. v. Hodel, 840 F.2d 45, 52 (D.C.
Cir. 1988) (“We therefore agree with the district court that what it terms the ‘mere
emotional injuries’ in this case are noncognizable.”).
40 E.g., Catholic League for Religious & Civil Rights v. City & County of San
Francisco, 624 F.3d 1043, 1050 (9th Cir. 2010); Clayton v. White Hall Sch. Dist., 875
F.2d 676, 679 (8th Cir. 1989).
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harm and other forms of noneconomic or intangible injury—
such as aesthetic, emotional, or stigmatic harm.41 But how
does psychological harm relate to aesthetic, emotional, or
stigmatic injuries, and can psychological harm on its own
suffice for standing?
The thorny terminological landscape makes it difficult
to tell whether courts are talking about the same phenomenon
when they refer to various harms using the term “psychological,”
or whether they are talking past one another. These definitional
issues are further complicated by the fact that the terms
“psychological harm” and, even more strongly, “psychic injury”
sometimes seem to be used primarily to dismiss the reality of a
harm or to contrast a plaintiff ’s claims with an ostensibly more
legitimate harm.42 The definitional issue, in other words, is not
merely terminological; it speaks to the substantive question of
what the “state of the law” on psychological harm and
constitutional standing actually is.
This article defines psychological harm as mental or
emotional suffering or distress. This definition is intended to be
broad and to encompass a wide variety of psychological reactions,
including fear, sorrow, humiliation, and anger. This approach
reflects a preference for courts to limit the cognizability of
psychological harm as a matter of substantive law, rather than
as a matter of definition. For example, the definition of
psychological harm presented here includes a sense of offense or
insult—harms that courts are especially wary of cognizing as
injury-in-fact.43 But courts need not cognize all feelings of insult
or offense; rather, they may draw distinctions between types of
psychological harm that count as injury-in-fact and types of
41 E.g., Denney v. Deutsche Bank AG, 443 F.3d 253, 265 (2d Cir. 2006)
(“[A]esthetic, emotional, or psychological harms also suffice for standing purposes.”); see
also Coal. for the Env’t v. Volpe, 504 F.2d 156, 167 (8th Cir. 1974) (finding standing for
proponents of an effort to enjoin a new development because plaintiffs stood to lose
open space and natural environment, the viewing of which “provides aesthetic and
psychological benefit”).
42 See Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 619, 629,
636 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that “Psychic Injury” is “a contradiction of
the basic propositions that the function of the judicial power ‘is, solely, to decide on the
rights of individuals,’ and that generalized grievances affecting the public at large have
their remedy in the political process” (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
137, 170 (1803))); Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 107 (1998)
(“[A]lthough a suitor may derive great comfort and joy from the fact that the United States
Treasury is not cheated, that a wrongdoer gets his just deserts, or that the Nation’s
laws are faithfully enforced, that psychic satisfaction is not an acceptable Article III
remedy because it does not redress a cognizable Article III injury.”); Humane Soc’y of
the U.S. v. Babbitt, 46 F.3d 93, 98 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (“[G]eneral emotional ‘harm,’ no matter
how deeply felt, cannot suffice for injury-in-fact for standing purposes.”).
43 See, e.g., Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches v. U.S. Navy (In re Navy
Chaplaincy), 534 F.3d 756, 763 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
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harm that do not, without asserting that the latter types are
simply not forms of psychological harm. The purpose of taking
a broad approach to the definition of “psychological harm” is to
avoid miring the courts in contentious arguments about the
definition of “psychological harm” as the legally operative step
in the analysis. Such arguments could provoke the criticism
that the courts’ very definitions are arbitrary and suspect.
Further, if courts had to restrict the definition of psychological
harm partially on the basis of whether the injury was cognizable,
they might create a technical sense of “psychological harm”
unmoored from any nonlegal understanding of the phenomenon.
The line between psychological harm and physical harm
is not always clear-cut. For example, people may experience
changed mental states as a consequence of physical injuries;
mental illnesses have physical symptoms; and certain phenomena,
such as lethargy and intoxication, span across mental and physical
boundaries. Though this article cannot address all approaches to
the relationship between psychological and physical harm, it
generally focuses on psychological harm independently of any
physical effects that such harm may have.
Additionally, the definition of psychological harm
presented here includes emotional harm. Emotional harm is
mentioned frequently in the case law,44 sometimes in the same
breath as psychological harm,45 and this article’s conclusions
apply to emotional harm to the same extent that they apply to
psychological harm in general. This article does not, however,
make any substantive conclusions on the basis of a distinction
among psychological harm, emotional harm, and mental harm.
The aim is simply to devise a broad working definition of
psychological harm that largely fits current invocations of the
concept in the case law and provides a useful reference point
for further discussion.
“Psychological injury” and “psychological harm” appear
in areas of law other than the law of standing.46 For example,
the law of workers’ compensation in various states deals with
the question of whether and to what extent psychological injury
44 E.g., Leibovitz v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 252 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2001);
Babbitt, 46 F.3d at 98; Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 25 (D.D.C. 2010); Estate
of Morris ex rel.Morris v. Dapolito, 297 F. Supp. 2d 680 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
45 E.g., Leibovitz, 252 F.2d at 184; Denney v. Deutsche Bank AG, 443 F.3d
253, 265 (2d Cir. 2006).
46 For example, William J. Koch writes that “[p]sychological injuries are stress-
related emotional conditions resulting from real or imagined threats or injuries that may
become the subjects of personal injury litigation, workers compensation claims, criminal
injury compensation, other disability claims, or human rights tribunals.” WILLIAM J. KOCH
ET AL., PSYCHOLOGICAL INJURIES: FORENSICASSESSMENT, TREATMENT, ANDLAW 3 (2006).
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is compensable.47 Psychological injury is a factor (though not a
necessary one) used in assessing hostile work environment
claims under Title VII,48 and a victim’s suffering from “extreme
psychological injury” is a ground for upward departure under
the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines.49
Psychological injury in these contexts often refers to a
relatively grave form of psychological damage—one sufficient to
meet a threshold of eligibility for legal compensation or redress.50
For example, one treatise defines psychological injury as
the result of exposure to an incident that is mentally and emotionally
traumatic because the incident presents a threat to the plaintiff ’s life:
to health, to control over one’s life, to peace of mind and enjoyment of
life, or even the threat of death itself. The individual is reminded of
weaknesses and vulnerability and the lack of control over catastrophic
events that can happen in an instant, without any warning, and that
can totally alter or end a person’s life.51
This article’s proposed approach for evaluating whether
psychological harm should confer Article III standing does not
require psychological harm to be grave in this way. Instead, the
article’s approach calls for courts to consider the harm’s gravity
alongside other relevant factors, such as the harm’s longevity and
frequency, in assessing the cognizability of psychological harm.
Gravity may weigh in favor of cognizability, but it does not
constitute an inflexible threshold. This approach is intended to
allow courts to make judgments about whether psychological
harm counts as injury-in-fact that are predicated on a variety
of relevant circumstances.52 The article’s approach also reflects
47 See Eric M. Larsson & Jean A. Talbot, Recovery Under Workers’ Compensation
Statute for Emotional Injury or Disease Caused by Work-Connected Stress Without
Physical Cause or Result, in 45 CAUSES OF ACTION 2D 341 (2010).
48 1 FAIR EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES § 9:32 (2016); see Harris v. Forklift Sys.,
Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-23 (1993) (finding that conduct that has a serious effect on “a
reasonable person’s psychological well-being” is actionable as a violation of Title VII’s
protection against a hostile or abusive work environment, though such an effect is not
required).
49 Extreme Psychological Injury: Policy Statement, FED. SENT. L. & PRAC.
§ 5K2.3 (2015).
50 See KOCH ET AL., supra note 46, at 3.
51 26 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3d 1 (1994); see also U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.3 (2015) (stating that “[n]ormally psychological injury would
be sufficiently severe to warrant application of this adjustment only when there is a
substantial impairment of the intellectual, psychological, emotional, or behavioral
functioning of a victim, when the impairment is likely to be of an extended or continuous
duration, and when the impairment manifests itself by physical or psychological symptoms
or by changes in behavior patterns”); Gerald Young & Eric Y. Drogin, Psychological Injury
and Law I: Causality, Malingering, and PTSD, 3 MENTAL HEALTH L. & POL’Y J. 373
(2014) (discussing posttraumatic stress disorder, chronic pain, and traumatic brain injury
as examples of psychological injury).
52 See infra Section II.A.3 for a discussion of gravity as part of the inquiry
into whether a particular instance of psychological harm counts as injury-in-fact.
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the fact that the term “psychological harm” in the case law is not
necessarily used to describe grave trauma.53 More broadly, as
noted above, the proposed approach emphasizes not the definition
of psychological harm, but the question of which types of
psychological harm can create standing. The article is not offering
a theory of the nature of psychological harm; rather, it is
developing a view of Article III standing that identifies certain
kinds of psychological harm, and not others, as sufficient to
create standing.
Another terminological point is that this article, for the
sake of clarity and consistency, uses the phrase “psychological
harm” rather than “psychological injury” except when quoting
directly from cases or articles that mention “psychological
injury.” More specifically, the article uses “psychological harm”
(and “emotional harm”) to refer to the suffering that is allegedly
undergone by the plaintiff. The article then refers to the forms
of conduct that (according to plaintiffs’ allegations) give rise to
psychological harm as “injuries.”
It is also instructive to consider the relationship
between psychological harm and ideas such as “intangible,”
“expressive,” “stigmatic,” “aesthetic,” and “reputational” injury or
harm. Although “intangible injury” recently received attention in
the Supreme Court case Spokeo v. Robins, the Court in Spokeo
did not explicitly define this term, though it cited a free speech
case and a free exercise case as examples of intangible injury.54
One way to define intangible injury, and the approach that this
article adopts, is to state that intangible injuries are those that
are not economic or physical. This category incorporates a wide
variety of injuries. Some types of injuries mentioned in the case
law and scholarly literature on the topic of standing are “expressive
injury,” “stigmatic injury,” “aesthetic injury,” and “reputational
injury.” The following descriptions can help to structure an
understanding of this nonexclusive list of intangible injuries
53 For example, the Sixth Circuit in 2011 found “psychological injury in fact
sufficient to confer standing” when the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) challenged
an Ohio judge’s practice of hanging a poster with text including the Ten Commandments in
his courtroom. ACLU of Ohio Found., Inc. v. DeWeese, 633 F.3d 424, 429 (6th Cir.
2011). It seems at least possible that ACLU members (one of whom practiced law in the
judge’s courtroom) did not experience severe mental or emotional trauma; at least, the
court’s reasoning did not draw attention to any such trauma. Id. The Second Circuit, in
Denney v. Deutsche Bank, also provided no indication that the kind of psychological
damage that individuals had suffered in taking action in reliance on fraudulent tax
advice rose to the level of psychological injury actionable, for example, in a workers’
compensation claim. See Denney v. Deutsche Bank AG, 443 F.3d 253, 265 (2d Cir. 2006).
54 See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016) (citing Pleasant
Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460 (2009), a free speech case, and Church of the
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993), a free exercise case).
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(and the categories below may overlap). Expressive injury,
following Richard H. Pildes and Richard G. Niemi, “results from
the ideas or attitudes expressed . . . rather than from the more
tangible or material consequences the action brings about.”55
Expressive injury frequently sends a demeaning message to the
plaintiff, creating overlap between expressive and stigmatic
injury.56 Stigmatic injury refers to a form of treatment that “marks”
the plaintiff in some way as defective, low, or unworthy of respect.57
Aesthetic injury is injury to a plaintiff ’s opportunity to enjoy an
aesthetically pleasing phenomenon.58 Reputational injury can be
understood as conduct that lowers the opinion of the plaintiff held
by members of a relevant community for a given trait.
In light of these understandings of various forms of
intangible injury, how does intangible injury relate to
psychological harm? First, psychological harm might be viewed as
a type of intangible injury—or intangible harm, if “harm” is used
to refer to the effects of an intangible injury (just as this article
uses psychological “harm” to refer to psychological effects on
plaintiffs). Psychological harm is, after all, a form of noneconomic
and nonphysical damage. Second, psychological harm might be
viewed as a potential effect of intangible injury. So, for
example, having one’s reputation sullied may induce a negative
mental or emotional reaction. On the latter account, psychological
harm is not a necessary result of intangible injury, and it could
also result from economic or physical injury. This article does
not limit its analysis to one of these conceptions of the relationship
between psychological harm and intangible injury, since the key
points about this relationship are the same for the article’s
purposes. First, on both accounts, psychological harm is not the
equivalent of intangible injury. Psychological harm might be a
subset of intangible injury subject to its own constraints on
cognizability, or a possible (though not necessary) consequence
55 Pildes & Niemi, supra note 36, at 506-07. Pildes and Niemi refer to “the ideas
or attitudes expressed through a governmental action,” but for the purposes of this
article, expressive harm need not stem from government action. Id.
56 See Note, Expressive Harms and Standing, supra note 36, at 1314 (“Expressive
harms . . . are specifically concerned with the message—often a message of racial, gender,
or religious inferiority—expressed by governmental action. Social meaning, defined as
‘the semiotic content attached to various actions, or inactions, or statuses, within a
particular context,’ produces expressive harms.” (footnotes omitted) (quoting Lawrence
Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 951 (1995))). For an
explanation of expressive theories in the context of criminal law, see Dan M. Kahan,
What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 594-605 (1996).
57 See Healy, supra note 36, at 448 (citing ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES
ON THEMANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY (1963)).
58 One judicial decision (albeit later vacated) stated that “[t]he term ‘aesthetic’
in ordinary usage refers to an artistic sense or a sense of beauty.” Animal Legal Def. Fund
v. Veneman, 469 F.3d 826, 833 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated, 490 F.3d 725 (9th Cir. 2007).
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of intangible injury. Second, on both accounts of the relationship
between psychological harm and intangible injury, there are close
connections between the two concepts, such that accepting the
cognizability of intangible injury raises questions about why
psychological harm should not also be explicitly recognized.59
With this conceptual framework in mind, the next section
expands on and critiques the treatment of psychological harm in
current Article III standing doctrine.
B. The State of the Law Today
1. Supreme Court Jurisprudence
Though the Supreme Court has never directly answered
the question of whether and under which conditions psychological
harm could count as injury-in-fact, the Court has ruled on several
issues that offer clues to evaluating a claim based on
psychological harm.
As an initial matter, the Supreme Court has not limited
standing to those who have lost money. The Court has long
accepted the general proposition that noneconomic injuries may
count as injury for standing purposes,60 and several specific
types of intangible injuries have been recognized as sufficient.
This section describes several such forms of injury, though it is
not intended to provide an exhaustive list. These intangible
injuries could theoretically be cognized without resort to any
discussion of psychological harm, but it is plausible to think that
they embody a concern for the influence of challenged conduct on
plaintiffs’ mental and emotional lives—a concern that, as
discussed below,61 supports the explicit recognition of
psychological harm as injury-in-fact.
a. Aesthetic Injury
The Supreme Court has explicitly recognized harm to
aesthetic interests as a legitimate Article III injury.62 In a well-
59 See infra Section II.A.1.
60 Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp (ADAPSO), 397 U.S. 150,
154 (1970); see Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016).
61 See infra Section II.A.1.
62 See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562-63 (1992) (“Of course, the
desire to use or observe an animal species, even for purely esthetic purposes, is undeniably
a cognizable interest for purpose[s] of standing.”); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727,
734 (1972) (“Aesthetic and environmental well-being, like economic well-being, are
important ingredients of the quality of life in our society, and the fact that particular
environmental interests are shared by the many rather than the few does not make
them less deserving of legal protection through the judicial process.”); ADAPSO, 397
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known example, the Court found standing partially on the
basis of aesthetic injury in Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw, where
it held that environmental groups had Article III standing to
bring a challenge against operators of a wastewater treatment
plant for violations of the Clean Water Act.63 One member of the
plaintiff organization alleged, in the Court’s words, that
he occasionally drove over the North Tyger River, and that it looked
and smelled polluted; and that he would like to fish, camp, swim,
and picnic in and near the river between 3 and 15 miles downstream
from the facility . . . but would not do so because he was concerned
that the water was polluted by Laidlaw’s discharges.64
The Supreme Court found that this member of the organization
(and others) had presented sufficient evidence of harm to their
own interests to support standing.65 Put differently, the Supreme
Court found injury-in-fact based on the reduced aesthetic and
recreational value that plaintiffs derived from a certain area.
b. “Spiritual Stake” Injury
If a government erects a religious display on public
land, and a plaintiff wishes to challenge it as a violation of the
Establishment Clause, how can she have standing to do so?
After all, she will likely have trouble claiming that she has
been monetarily or physically harmed.66 The Supreme Court
has not been unresponsive to this concern. In 1970, the Court
indicated that “[a] person or a family may have a spiritual
stake in First Amendment values sufficient to give standing to
raise issues concerning the Establishment Clause and the Free
Exercise Clause.”67 In 1968, in Flast v. Cohen, the Court carved
U.S. at 154 (quoting Scenic Hudson Pres. Conference v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 354 F.2d
608, 616 (1965)).
63 Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S.
167, 173-74 (2000).
64 Id. at 181-82.
65 Id. at 183. As for the organization’s standing, the Court explained that
[a]n association has standing to bring suit on behalf of its members when its
members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right, the interests
at stake are germane to the organization’s purpose, and neither the claim
asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual
members in the lawsuit.
Id. at 181.
66 For discussions of standing in an Establishment Clause context, see
Esbeck, supra note 36, and Austin, supra note 36.
67 Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp (ADAPSO), 397 U.S.
150, 154 (1970). Later, the Supreme Court emphasized that this language should not
be read to suggest that “any person asserting an Establishment Clause violation
possesses a ‘spiritual stake’ sufficient to confer standing,” in the absence of exposure to
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out an exception to the general rule that taxpayers have no
standing, in their capacity as taxpayers, to challenge a federal
statute’s constitutionality.68 Specifically, the Court held that
the taxpayers in Flast had standing to sue the government to
challenge laws authorizing the use of federal funds in ways
that allegedly violated the Establishment and Free Exercise
Clauses.69 But the Court has since emphasized the narrowness
of this exception.70 Moreover, some Justices have called for the
Court to reject “Psychic Injury” in Establishment Clause cases
and to stop the “conceptualizing of injury in fact in purely mental
terms.”71 Psychological standing doctrine in Establishment Clause
cases presents, to some degree, unique issues because of the
taxpayer standing exception. But this doctrine also reflects
courts’ broader ambivalence about cognizing harms that appear
to be confined to plaintiffs’ minds and emotions, despite the
seeming recognition that certain kinds of illegal conduct
primarily exert influence in this way.
c. Stigmatic Injury
In the area of stigmatic or dignitary injury, the Supreme
Court has made interesting distinctions between different
kinds of stigmatic injury.72 In 1984, in Allen v. Wright, the Court
denied standing to parents of black public school children who
challenged the Internal Revenue Service’s grant of tax-exempt
status to racially discriminatory private schools.73 The Court
stated that the plaintiffs’ claim could be interpreted as “a claim
of stigmatic injury, or denigration, suffered by all members of a
racial group when the Government discriminates on the basis of
race.”74 The Court then rejected standing based on such a claim,
because accepting it would enable “[a] black person in Hawaii” to
the Establishment Clause violation. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for
Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 487 n.22 (1982). Regarding the Free
Exercise Clause, the Supreme Court in Spokeo used the free exercise case Church of
the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993), as an example to
support the statement that “intangible injuries can nevertheless be concrete.” Spokeo,
Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016). Hialeah, however, did not explicitly discuss
standing or Article III.
68 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
69 Id.
70 See, e.g., Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 609-11
(2007).
71 See id. at 619-20 (Scalia, J., concurring, joined by Thomas, J.).
72 For discussions of stigmatic harm and standing that explore Allen v. Wright,
see Healy, supra note 36, and Carter Greenbaum, Standing of Stigma Under Article III
7-10 (June 20, 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
73 Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
74 Id. at 754.
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“challenge the grant of a tax exemption to a racially discriminatory
school in Maine,” thereby “transform[ing] the federal courts into ‘no
more than a vehicle for the vindication of the value interests of
concerned bystanders.’”75
Notably, however, the Court’s opinion in Allen said more.
In particular, the Court stated that “stigmatizing injury . . . is
sufficient in some circumstances to support standing” for “those
persons who are personally denied equal treatment.”76 Moreover,
in a footnote, the Court stated that the parents’ “stigmatic injury,
though not sufficient for standing in the abstract form in which
their complaint asserts it, is judicially cognizable to the extent
that respondents are personally subject to discriminatory
treatment.”77 The Court continued: “The stigmatic injury thus
requires identification of some concrete interest with respect to
which respondents are personally subject to discriminatory
treatment.”78 Allen v. Wright therefore suggests that stigmatic
injury could suffice for standing when plaintiffs can show that
they, rather than other members of their racial or ethnic group,
have been treated unequally.79
d. Reputational Injury
An injury that is related, though not identical, to
stigmatic or dignitary harm is reputational harm. In Meese v.
Keene, the Supreme Court found standing for a California state
senator who challenged a law that would classify Canadian
films he wanted to exhibit as “political propaganda.”80 The
plaintiff claimed, according to the Court, that “his exhibition of
films that have been classified as ‘political propaganda’ by the
Department of Justice would substantially harm his chances
for reelection and would adversely affect his reputation in the
community.”81 The harm in this case might be viewed as a
mixture of economic and noneconomic harm. The Court indicated
that reputational harm, understood as “the risk of being seen in
75 Id. at 756 (quoting United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency
Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 687 (1973)).
76 Allen, 468 U.S. at 755 (quoting Heckler v. Matthews, 465 U.S. 728, 740 (1984)).
77 Id. at 757 n.22.
78 Id.
79 Justice Brennan, dissenting in Allen, stated that he did not need to reach
the issue of stigmatic injury, but he argued that the Court had mischaracterized the
plaintiffs’ stigmatic injury claim and that “the complaint, fairly read, limits the claim of
stigmatic injury from illegal governmental action to black children attending public
schools in districts that are currently desegregating yet contain discriminatory private
schools benefiting from illegal tax exemptions.” Id. at 770 n.3 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
80 Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465 (1987).
81 Id. at 474.
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an unfavorable light by the members of the public,” was
sufficient to establish the plaintiff ’s standing.82 This
reputational harm may have been closely tied to the plaintiff ’s
ability to maintain his seat and career (at least partially an
economic concern). Nevertheless, Justice Stevens, in a 1998
dissent, cited Meese v. Keene for the proposition that “an
interest in one’s reputation is sufficient to confer standing.”83
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Meese highlights the
extent to which psychological harms may be bound up with
economic ones, so that it can be difficult to say in certain cases
whether psychological harm “sufficed” for injury-in-fact.
Indeed, while a politician’s job may be viewed as an economic
good, the value of such a job may consist to a significant extent
of less “tangible” benefits such as being respected (or at least
deferred to) in the community, and the payoff of these benefits
might be especially prominent in the psychological realm. The
implications of the connection between psychological harm and
other types of injury-in-fact are discussed further below.84 For
now, the point is that harm to a plaintiff ’s standing in the
community has arguably been recognized as injury-in-fact.
e. Opportunity to Compete
The Supreme Court’s affirmative action jurisprudence
furnishes an additional type of noneconomic injury. In
University of California v. Bakke, the Court took up a rejected
white medical school applicant’s claim that he had been
discriminated against, in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause, as a result of the school’s special admissions program
for minority applicants.85 The Court indicated that the plaintiff
applicant would have standing even in the event that he could
not prove that but for the school’s special admissions program,
82 Id. at 479 & n.14.
83 Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 22 (1998) (Stevens, J., dissenting). The
federal Courts of Appeals have repeatedly cited Meese v. Keene for the proposition that
reputational harm can be cognized as injury-in-fact. See Parsons v. U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, 801 F.3d 701, 711 (6th Cir. 2015) (“Reputational injury, on the other hand, is
sufficient to establish an injury in fact.” (citing Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. at 473-76));
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of New Jersey, 730 F.3d 208, 220 (3d Cir.
2013) (“As a matter of law, reputational harm is a cognizable injury in fact. The
Supreme Court so held in Meese v. Keene . . . .”); Foretich v. United States, 351 F.3d
1198, 1211 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (“Appellees concede, as they must, that injury to reputation
can constitute a cognizable injury sufficient for Article III standing.”) (citing, among
other cases,Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. at 473-77).
84 See infra Section II.A.1.
85 Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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he would have been admitted to medical school.86 The Court
explained that the trial court had found injury in this case
because the school had not allowed the plaintiff to compete for
all places in the class due to his race.87 In a later Supreme
Court case, the “inability to compete on an equal footing in the
bidding process” was accepted as injury-in-fact in the context of
a challenge to a government ordinance setting aside a certain
percentage of city contracts for minority-owned businesses.88
Consequently, plaintiffs may challenge affirmative action
programs by claiming not that they were deprived of a tangible
good (such as a government contract or admission to medical
school), but that they were deprived of the equal opportunity to
pursue this good. Deprivation of equal opportunity might be
cast, in economic terms, as a kind of reduction in the expected
value of the foregone good. But deprivation of equal opportunity
could also be viewed as an injury that is thought to affect
plaintiffs’ understanding of their relationship to the law and
their place in society—and that moves closer towards the
psychological realm.89
In sum, the Supreme Court has been willing to recognize
intangible injury as injury-in-fact in a variety of settings.90 Many
of these types of injury are sources of psychological harm, and
the detrimental nature of these injuries can be traced at least
in part to their effects on plaintiffs’ mental and emotional
states. Aesthetic, spiritual, stigmatic injury and the like might
be harmful even if no one felt mentally or emotionally
disturbed by their presence. But these injuries often effect
much of their damage to plaintiffs in the mental and emotional
realms, and the Court’s willingness to cognize these types of
86 Id. at 280 n.14. The Court also noted that the University of California had
effectively conceded that Bakke had standing, although, as required, the Court went on
to assess the issue of Bakke’s standing independently. Id.
87 Id.
88 Ne. Fla. Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of
Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 666 (1993); see also Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515
U.S. 200, 211 (1995).
89 See Reva B. Siegel, The Supreme Court 2012 Term—Foreword: Equality
Divided, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1, 45 n.221 (2013) (noting that in affirmative action cases,
“[s]howing injury in fact does not require demonstrating the wrongful distribution of a
good, but focuses instead on the meanings generated as government interacts with
citizens”). For a discussion of the standing of a recent plaintiff, Abigail Fisher, to
challenge the University of Texas’s affirmative action program, see Adam Chandler,
Legal Scholarship Highlight: The Trouble with Fisher, SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 6, 2012, 5:41
PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/09/legal-scholarship-highlight-the-trouble-with-fisher
[http://perma.cc/Q35D-WPZZ].
90 As noted above, this list of noneconomic or intangible injuries is not meant
to be exclusive. For example, the Supreme Court has also recognized, as “[i]ndividual
injury or injury-in-fact . . . the loss of important benefits from interracial associations.”
Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209-10 (1972).
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injury thus suggests that the door to psychological harm as
injury-in-fact remains open.91
At the same time, the Court’s record reveals strong
reluctance to cognize certain types of psychological harm. In
fact, the Court has sometimes treated these types of psychological
harm as if they could wholly undermine limitations on federal
courts’ jurisdiction. An analysis of psychological harm and Article
III standing that seeks to retain a connection to existing
doctrine—as this article does—must pay close attention to the
Court’s statements on forms of psychological harm that are not
cognizable as injury-in-fact. But it is important to recognize
that the Court has rejected only certain types of psychological
harm, as distinct from psychological harm writ large; the
challenge is to identify these types.
f. Psychological Harm Stemming Solely from
Disagreement with a Challenged Policy
The Supreme Court has refused to recognize as injury-
in-fact certain negative mental or emotional responses to conduct
with which plaintiffs disagree. In a 1982 Establishment Clause
case involving a challenge to a transfer of government property
to a religious institution, the Court denied standing to an
organization dedicated to the separation of church and state on
the basis that the plaintiffs “fail[ed] to identify any personal
injury suffered by them as a consequence of the alleged
constitutional error, other than the psychological consequence
presumably produced by observation of conduct with which one
disagrees.”92 In particular, the Court rejected the notion that
“the intensity of the litigant’s interest or the fervor of his
advocacy” could support Article III standing, noting that the
“concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
issues” is “the anticipated consequence of proceedings
commenced by one who has been injured in fact; it is not a
91 In addition, the Supreme Court (and other federal courts) may have not
questioned the existence of standing in cases in which psychological harm or a related
type of injury was the only predicate for standing. But “when questions of jurisdiction
have been passed on in prior decisions sub silentio, [the Supreme] Court has never
considered itself bound when a subsequent case finally brings the jurisdictional issue
before [it].” Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 119 (1984)
(quoting Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 535 n.5 (1974)). Moreover, federal courts have
an independent obligation to ensure that they have subject matter jurisdiction. See,
e.g., Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006) (“[C]ourts . . . have an independent
obligation to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists, even in the absence of
a challenge from any party.”).
92 Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church &
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 469, 485 (1982).
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permissible substitute for the showing of injury itself.”93 In
1998, the Court came to a similar conclusion in Steel Co. v.
Citizens for a Better Environment, where it denied standing to
members of an environmental group suing a steel
manufacturer for the failure to make reporting in a timely
manner, as required by statute.94 One of the issues was whether
the plaintiffs could meet the redressability requirement for
Article III standing on the ground that the relevant statute
required manufacturers to pay a penalty to the government for
violating the reporting provision.95 The Supreme Court answered
in the negative, reasoning that
although a suitor may derive great comfort and joy from the fact that
the United States Treasury is not cheated, that a wrongdoer gets his
just deserts, or that the Nation’s laws are faithfully enforced, that
psychic satisfaction is not an acceptable Article III remedy because it
does not redress a cognizable Article III injury.96
According to Steel Co., the psychological distress that people
might experience if certain political outcomes are frustrated cannot
constitute injury-in-fact. The Supreme Court’s treatment of
psychological reactions to disagreement with the defendant’s
(often the government’s) conduct is in line with the Court’s
more general insistence that citizens do not have standing to
sue simply on the basis that the law is not being, in their view,
properly enforced.97 The concern may well be about
bootstrapping. If any citizen could tack onto a claim that a
party was violating the law the additional allegation that she
was psychologically hurt by the alleged violation, then what
would become of injury-in-fact as a limitation on federal courts’
jurisdiction? Furthermore, when the challenged party is the
government, the Court has expressed strong reservations about
the threat to the executive’s enforcement role that would arise if
any citizen had standing to sue.98 This threat might materialize if a
great many psychologically distressed litigants could sue because
their preferred laws had been, in their view, improperly
executed. The Court has thus declined to recognize standing
93 Id. at 486 (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)).
94 Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 86-87 (1998).
95 Id. at 105-07.
96 Id. at 107; see also Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S.
587, 633 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Is a taxpayer’s purely psychological displeasure
that his funds are being spent in an allegedly unlawful manner ever sufficiently concrete
and particularized to support Article III standing? The answer is plainly no.”).
97 Cf. Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126 (1922).
98 See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 761 (1984).
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rooted purely in the psychological effects of policy
disagreement.
g. Fear or Anxiety About Future Events
Fear and anxiety about future events are common forms
of mental and emotional suffering, and they fall into the category
of psychological harm as defined in this article.99 But these types
of psychological harm raise special problems in the standing
context. In Clapper v. Amnesty International, the Supreme Court
held that a threatened injury must be “certainly impending” in
order to suffice for Article III standing—or, possibly, that there
must be a “substantial risk” that the threatened event will
occur.100 In doing so, the Court sought to avoid a situation in
which “an enterprising plaintiff would be able to secure a lower
standard for Article III standing simply by making an
expenditure based on a nonparanoid fear.”101 The idea is that if
plaintiffs could obtain standing by arguing that they feared a
future event that is not “certainly impending”—or by incurring
other injuries, such as monetary expenditures, in order to avoid
the feared event—then the Court’s insistence on “certainly
impending” injury would be severely weakened. Here, again,
the bootstrapping concern comes into play.
When if ever, then, could feelings of fear or anxiety
resulting from anticipation of future events count for standing?102
The Court has found standing on the basis of fear or anxiety in
certain cases—such as fear of polluting discharges103 and fear of
criminal prosecution in First Amendment cases.104 Yet the Court
99 Fear of future events also figures in Koch’s definition of “psychological
injury” in other legal contexts. See KOCH ET AL., supra note 46, at 3 (referring to “real or
imagined threats or injuries”).
100 Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147, 1150 n.5 (2013); see supra
note 27 and accompanying text.
101 Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1151.
102 For a discussion of “fear-based standing,” see Calabrese, supra note 36.
103 Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S.
167, 181-83 (2000) (finding standing where plaintiffs reasonably feared the effects of
pollution on a nearby waterway).
104 E.g., Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2343 (2014)
(finding standing where a political group feared that a statute prohibiting certain false
statements during political campaigns would be enforced against it); Babbitt v. United
Farm Workers Nat’l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979) (finding standing where plaintiffs
feared criminal prosecution under an allegedly unconstitutional statute). But see Laird
v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 10 (1972) (finding no federal court jurisdiction where plaintiffs
were concerned about the chilling of their First Amendment rights by a government
investigative program). Additionally, in Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental
Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978), the Court considered a district court’s finding
that “‘objectively reasonable’ present fear and apprehension” about nuclear power plant
emissions was part of the injury that created standing and declined to rule on whether
this apprehension was sufficiently concrete to create Article III standing. See id. at 72-
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has also circumscribed this ground for standing. In a notable
example, in City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, the Court denied
standing to a Los Angeles man who had been put in a
chokehold by the police and who sought an injunction against
the City of Los Angeles in order to prevent police officers from
using chokeholds in the future, unless they faced a threat of the
immediate use of deadly force.105 Lyons said he feared he would
be placed in a chokehold in a future encounter with the police,
but the Court rejected this allegation as a ground for standing:
It is the reality of the threat of repeated injury that is relevant to the
standing inquiry, not the plaintiff ’s subjective apprehensions. The
emotional consequences of a prior act simply are not a sufficient
basis for an injunction absent a real and immediate threat of future
injury by the defendant. Of course, emotional upset is a relevant
consideration in a damages action.106
Lyons should not be read, however, to eliminate fear
and anxiety as bases for standing.107 The case left open, for
instance, whether the emotional consequences of a prior act
could be the basis for an injunction if there were a real and
immediate threat of future injury by the defendant.108 As of now,
then, the Court’s doctrine does not preclude fear or anxiety
based on future events from counting for standing, but there
remain questions regarding when precisely these psychological
reactions could suffice.109
73 (quoting Carolina Envtl. Study Grp., Inc. v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm’n, 431 F.
Supp. 203, 209 (W.D.N.C. 1977)).
105 City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 98-100 (1983). For a critique of
this case for failing to vindicate the courts’ role as protectors of individual rights in a
constitutional democracy, see Jackson, supra note 36, at 161-75.
106 Lyons, 461 U.S. at 107 n.8.
107 A related issue is whether the Supreme Court does or should treat the risk
of harm as sufficient for injury-in-fact. See F. Andrew Hessick, Probabilistic Standing,
106 NW. U. L. REV. 55 (2012) (arguing that Article III does not impose a barrier on
claims with a low risk of future injury, but that prudential considerations may properly
limit courts’ review of such claims); see also Note, Standing—Challenges to Government
Surveillance—Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, 127 HARV. L. REV. 298, 305
(2013) (arguing that the “certainly impending” standard should be applied narrowly
because “most suits for injunctive relief involve harms that are by their nature
probabilistic, such as challenges to increased environmental or safety risks”). The risk
of harm could be viewed as a basis for standing independently of the psychological
harm resulting from plaintiffs’ beliefs about this risk. But paying attention to the risk
of harm also opens the door to a consideration of psychological effects, since in the
absence of the actual harm it becomes worth asking why courts should be concerned
about plaintiffs’ aversion to it. It is plausible to think that an important part of the
answer—though by no means the only part—is the effects of risk of harm on plaintiffs’
psychological experiences. See infra notes 258-61 and accompanying text.
108 See Lyons, 461 U.S. at 107 n.8, 109.
109 The Court’s jurisprudence on anticipation of future injury and standing also
throws into sharp relief the question of whether the Court’s treatment of psychological
harm speaks more to ripeness concerns than to standing. Ripeness refers to whether a
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Overall, then, Supreme Court jurisprudence on
psychological harm leaves open important issues. The Court
has not often referred directly to psychological or emotional
harm. When it has addressed this subject, the Court has
expressed concern about generalized and limitless standing, but
it has not analyzed the relationship between psychological harm
and noneconomic injuries that have been cognized as injury-in-
fact. Furthermore, the Court has not clearly delineated the
bounds of the type of “psychological consequence” that does not
suffice for standing.110 Other federal courts, however, have also
confronted issues of psychological harm and standing. Therefore,
the article now turns to lower federal courts’ development of
doctrine in this area.
2. Lower Federal Courts’ Positions on Psychological
Harm and Standing
This section examines federal appellate and district
court jurisprudence on psychological harm and related concepts
(such as emotional, aesthetic, and reputational injury) in the
standing context. A more detailed breakdown appears in the
Appendix.111 The analysis reveals interesting possibilities for
standards to govern the cognizability of psychological harm,
some of which are supported in Part II. In general, however,
the investigation of relevant case law suggests that there is a
dearth of discussion regarding the distinction between the type
of psychological harm that can create standing and the type of
psychological harm that cannot.
controversy is ready for judicial resolution at a given stage. The Supreme Court has
explained the test for ripeness as “whether the issues tendered are appropriate for
judicial resolution, and . . . the hardship to the parties if judicial relief is denied at that
stage.” Toilet Goods Ass’n v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158, 162 (1967). Part of the Court’s
reluctance to cognize psychological harm in certain circumstances, especially when the
psychological harm involves fear or anxiety about future events, could implicitly be
traced to a ripeness-related sense that no justiciable controversy has yet arisen—
because, for example, it is easier to see what is at stake in a controversy when plaintiffs
are alleging economic or physical harm. While this article follows several courts in
treating fear or anxiety about future harm as a matter of standing rather than
ripeness, this article’s discussion of factors to be used in evaluating standing claims
based on psychological harm takes into account issues related to ripeness, such as the
gravity of anticipated harm.
110 Cf. Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1121 (10th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he Supreme
Court has not provided clear and explicit guidance on the difference between psychological
consequence from disagreement with government conduct and noneconomic injury that is
sufficient to confer standing.”).
111 See Appendix. The Appendix does not provide an exhaustive list of all cases
related to psychological harm and standing. Rather, the Appendix seeks to provide a
wide-ranging sample of cases that illuminate the variety of approaches that courts
have taken to this topic.
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To provide a brief overview of case law in the federal
Courts of Appeals: the D.C., Second, Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth
Circuits have accepted psychological or emotional harm in
some form as sufficient for Article III injury-in-fact.112 The
scenarios in which psychological or emotional harm has been
cognized range from “generalized anxiety and stress” suffered
by employees when a laptop containing their names, addresses,
and social security numbers was stolen from their employer,113
to “psychological and emotional injuries” resulting from a
hostile working environment,114 to emotional harm suffered by
an elephant handler alleging that the circus for which he
worked mistreated its elephants.115 The Fifth Circuit has also
recently suggested that emotional harm could count as injury-in-
fact.116 The Seventh Circuit has shown perhaps the most reluctance
112 See Chaudhry v. City of Los Angeles, 751 F.3d 1096, 1109 (9th Cir. 2014)
(finding a sufficient allegation of “emotional harm (injury in fact)” when city authorities
had failed to notify plaintiffs in a timely manner of their relative’s death); Red River
Freethinkers v. City of Fargo, 679 F.3d 1015, 1024 (8th Cir. 2012) (finding, in an
Establishment Clause case, that “[t]o the extent that emotional harms differ from
other, more readily quantifiable harms, that difference lacks expression in Article III’s
case-or-controversy requirement”); Catholic League for Religious & Civil Rights v. City
& County of San Francisco, 624 F.3d 1043, 1052 (9th Cir. 2010) (stating that a
“psychological consequence” does “constitute concrete harm where the ‘psychological
consequence’ is produced by government condemnation of one’s own religion or
endorsement of another’s in one’s own community”); Leibovitz v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth.,
252 F.3d 179, 184 (2d Cir. 2001) (“Leibovitz has alleged an actual injury to herself: the
emotional trauma she suffered as a result of an allegedly hostile work environment.”);
Denney v. Deutsche Bank AG, 443 F.3d 253, 265 (2d Cir. 2006) (“The risk of future
harm may also entail economic costs, such as medical monitoring and preventative
steps; but aesthetic, emotional[,] or psychological harms also suffice for standing
purposes.”); ACLU of Ohio Found., Inc. v. DeWeese, 633 F.3d 424, 429 (6th Cir. 2011)
(“In suits bought under the Establishment Clause, ‘direct and unwelcome’ contact with
the contested object demonstrates psychological injury in fact sufficient to confer
standing.” (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 103 (1998)));
Am. Soc’y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Ringling Bros. and Barnum &
Bailey Circus (APSCA I), 317 F.3d 334, 337 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (“[In a previous case], we
left open the question whether ‘emotional attachment to a particular animal . . . could
form the predicate of a claim of injury. . . .’ We answer that question in the affirmative
today.” (citation omitted) (quoting Humane Soc’y v. Babbitt, 46 F.3d 93 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
(alteration in original))); Fund for Animals, Inc. v. Lujan, 962 F.2d 1391, 1396 (9th Cir.
1992) (“[T]he Fund’s members had standing to sue because of the psychological injury
they suffered from viewing the killing of the bison in Montana.”); Gray v. Greyhound
Lines, E., 545 F.2d 169, 175 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (“We therefore see no reason why the
psychological injuries which plaintiffs claim are caused by defendants’ actions cannot
serve as the basis for invoking judicial remedies against defendants.”); Coal. for the
Env’t v. Volpe, 504 F.2d 156, 167 (8th Cir. 1974) (“Individual plaintiffs and members of
plaintiff organizations claim particularized injury stemming in various ways from the
loss of open space . . . . For instance, they assert that they will lose off-tract uses such
as viewing the open space and natural environment, which, contend plaintiffs, provides
aesthetic and psychological benefit.”).
113 Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1142 (9th Cir. 2010).
114 Leibovitz, 252 F.3d at 184.
115 APSCA I, 317 F.3d at 338.
116 Rideau v. Keller Indep. Sch. Dist., 819 F. 3d 155, 168-69 (5th Cir. 2016)
(“The emotional pain that results from seeing one’s child abused seems to be a
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to cognize psychological or emotional harm. This court found in a
2015 case, for example, that “[a]lthough we have described
standing as ‘undemanding,’ neither intellectual curiosity nor
purely psychological harm suffices to establish it.”117 Some circuits
have rejected psychological or emotional harm that is “general” or
that stems from personal disagreement based on commitment
to a legal principle.118 As for other forms of intangible harm,
several circuits have found standing based on aesthetic
injury,119 and a few circuits have accepted reputational120 and
stigmatic121 injury.
The degree to which courts are contradicting one another
in arriving at these decisions is not clear. For example, there is a
question about how the Seventh Circuit’s “purely” psychological
harm relates to other circuits’ references to psychological harm;
sufficiently concrete injury for standing purposes. . . . Indeed, the number of causes of
action in which a person may recover for emotional harm—from many common law
claims including, most obviously, intentional inflection of emotional distress to section
1983 claims that rely on common law remedies—supports the notion that emotional
harm satisfies the ‘injury in fact’ requirement of constitutional standing.” (internal
footnote omitted)).
117 United States v. All Funds on Deposit with R.J. O’Brien & Assocs., 783
F.3d 607, 616 (7th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted) (quoting Family & Children’s Ctr., Inc.
v. Sch. City of Mishawaka, 13 F.3d 1052, 1058 (7th Cir. 1994)); see also Freedom From
Religion Found., Inc. v. Lew, 773 F.3d 815, 820 (7th Cir. 2014) (finding, in an
Establishment Clause case involving tax exemptions for a “minister of the gospel,” that
“psychic injury alone is insufficient” to create standing); Clay v. Fort Wayne Cmty.
Schs., 76 F.3d 873, 877 n.4 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating, in a discrimination case where the
allegation was that the school system’s Board of Trustees discriminated against African-
Americans in the search to hire a school superintendent, that “[a]t best, the students
allege amorphous psychological injuries insufficient to confer standing”); Freedom
From Religion Found., Inc. v. Zielke, 845 F.2d 1463, 1467 (7th Cir. 1988) (noting, in an
Establishment Clause case involving a Ten Commandments monument in a public
park, that “[t]he psychological harm that results from witnessing conduct with which
one disagrees, however, is not sufficient to confer standing on a litigant”). But see
Leung v. XPO Logistics, Inc., No. 15-cv-3877, 2015 WL 10433667, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Dec.
9, 2015) (stating, in a Telephone Consumer Protection Act case about unwanted survey
calls, that “[i]njuries to emotional and dignitary interests are among those that count
as injuries in fact”).
118 See, e.g., Schaffer v. Clinton, 240 F.3d 878, 884 (10th Cir. 2001) (stating, in
a case on the Twenty-Seventh Amendment, that “Congressman Schaffer’s moral
outrage, however profoundly and personally felt, does not endow him with standing to
sue in the present action”); Humane Soc’y of U.S. v. Babbitt, 46 F.3d 93, 98 (D.C. Cir.
1995) (“[G]eneral emotional ‘harm,’ no matter how deeply felt, cannot suffice for injury-
in-fact for standing purposes.”).
119 E.g., Sierra Club v. Franklin Cty. Power of Illinois, LLC, 546 F.3d 918 (7th
Cir. 2008); Am. Canoe Ass’n v. Murphy Farms, Inc., 326 F.3d 505, 517 (4th Cir. 2003);
Coal. for the Env’t v. Volpe, 504 F.2d 156, 167 (8th Cir. 1974).
120 See Parsons v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 801 F.3d 701, 711 (6th Cir. 2015);
NCAA v. Governor of New Jersey, 730 F.3d 208, 220 (3d Cir. 2013); Foretich v. United
States, 351 F.3d 1198, 1212 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
121 See Parsons, 801 F.3d at 712; Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1122-23 & n.8
(10th Cir. 2012); Catholic League for Religious & Civil Rights v. City & County of San
Francisco, 624 F.3d 1043, 1052-53 (9th Cir. 2010); Smith v. City of Cleveland Heights,
760 F.2d 720, 722 (6th Cir. 1985).
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perhaps “purely” psychological harm is a distinct phenomenon.
The bottom line is that psychological and emotional harm have
been recognized as injury-in-fact in several, though not all,
circuits, and this provides all the more reason to take these
claims seriously. Further, the current case law provides support
for the position that psychological harm in some form should
constitute injury-in-fact for standing purposes, but leaves open
the issue of which types of harms are sufficient.
One conclusion that emerges from the review of the case
law is that psychological injury-in-fact is not monolithic; it
should be considered contextually, with reference to a variety
of substantive claims. The article therefore turns to the lower
federal courts’ treatment of psychological injury-in-fact in
commonly cited subject areas.
a. Establishment Clause
Establishment Clause jurisprudence, as noted above,
presents a challenging and fertile ground for consideration of
psychological harm, since it is difficult to point to a monetary
or physical harm that citizens suffer when the state takes
action that violates the clause.122 Lower courts have grappled in
different ways with the Supreme Court’s statement, in the
Establishment Clause context, that “the psychological consequence
presumably produced by observation of conduct with which one
disagrees” is insufficient to confer standing.123
First, some courts have denied standing claims on the
basis that plaintiffs alleging violations of the Establishment
Clause have failed to assert a sufficiently particularized or,
perhaps, genuine harm. In Freedom From Religion Foundation,
Inc. v. Obama, for example, the Seventh Circuit in 2011 rejected,
on standing grounds, a suit challenging a federal statute
designating a “National Day of Prayer,” as well as presidential
prayer proclamations issued under the statute.124 The plaintiffs
alleged that the challenged actions made them feel excluded
and unwelcome.125 The Seventh Circuit responded that “[i]t is
122 See Catholic League, 624 F.3d at 1049 (“The concept of a ‘concrete’ injury is
particularly elusive in the Establishment Clause context . . . because the Establishment
Clause is primarily aimed at protecting non-economic interests of a spiritual, as
opposed to a physical or pecuniary, nature.” (quoting Vasquez v. Los Angeles Cty., 487
F.3d 1246, 1250 (9th Cir. 2007) (alteration in original))).
123 Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church &
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 485 (1982).
124 Freedom From Religion Found., Inc. v. Obama, 641 F.3d 803 (7th Cir.
2011).
125 Id. at 806-07.
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difficult to see how any reader of the 2010 proclamation would
feel excluded or unwelcome,” but even if the plaintiffs did “feel
slighted . . . , hurt feelings differ from legal injury,” and “unless
all limits on standing are to be abandoned, a feeling of alienation
cannot suffice as injury in fact.”126
Second, some courts have considered whether plaintiffs
have shown that their psychological harm has given rise to some
kind of nonpsychological harm, such as plaintiffs’ physical
avoidance of a religious display.127 This approach seems to reflect
an evidentiary concern. Plaintiffs may not be able to show the
court exactly what is going on in their heads, but they can show
the court that they took active steps to avoid contact with the
source of the psychological harm. Of course, courts might also
worry that plaintiffs would manufacture such avoidance,128 but
courts may be reassured by the presence of one additional step
beyond the allegation of psychological harm. Third, some courts
have been willing to cognize psychological harm itself if it is
sufficiently particularized—if, for example, the plaintiff was
forced to appear regularly in the vicinity of the challenged
religious display,129 lived in the same city and had “come in
contact” with the challenged practice,130 or was a participant in
the same graduation ceremony as the challenged practice.131
126 Id. at 807-09; see also Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches v. U.S. Navy (In
re Navy Chaplaincy), 534 F.3d 756, 764 (D.C. Cir. 2008). In the case In re Navy
Chaplaincy, Protestant navy chaplains claimed, inter alia, that they were being
subjected to the “message” conveyed by a retirement program that was allegedly
preferential to Catholic chaplains, even if the plaintiffs had not personally been
discriminated against, and that as a consequence of this program, the plaintiffs felt
like second-class citizens within the Navy Chaplaincy. The D.C. Circuit responded that
under the plaintiffs’ standing theory, “any recipient of the Navy’s ‘message’ in this case,
including the judges on this panel, would have standing to bring suit challenging the
allegedly discriminatory Chaplain Corps.” In re Navy Chaplaincy, 534 F.3d at 763-64.
127 See, e.g., Barnes-Wallace v. City of San Diego, 530 F.3d 776, 782-84 (9th
Cir. 2008); Freedom From Religion Found., Inc. v. Zielke, 845 F.2d 1463, 1467-68 (7th
Cir. 1988).
128 In Clapper, for example, the Supreme Court insisted that plaintiffs “cannot
manufacture standing by choosing to make expenditures based on hypothetical future
harm that is not certainly impending.” Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138,
1143 (2013).
129 See ACLU of Ohio Found., Inc. v. DeWeese, 633 F.3d 424, 429-30 (6th Cir.
2011).
130 See Catholic League for Religious & Civil Rights v. City & County of San
Francisco, 624 F.3d 1043, 1053 (9th Cir. 2010).
131 Does 1-7 v. Round Rock Indep. Sch. Dist., 540 F. Supp. 2d 735 (W.D. Tex.
2007) (holding that students and their family members who participated in or attended
a graduation exercise had standing to sue their school district, which permitted the
graduating class to vote on whether a student would say a prayer at the high school
graduation ceremony).
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b. Animal Welfare
In the animal welfare context, psychological injury
provides a way for human plaintiffs to bring claims in an effort to
protect against harm to animals.132 “Emotional” harm is
mentioned particularly frequently in the animal welfare setting.
One approach that courts have taken in animal welfare cases is to
cognize emotional harm on the basis that it falls into the category
of aesthetic injury, which has been explicitly recognized by the
Supreme Court as injury-in-fact.133 For example, the D.C. Circuit
stated, when it found standing for a circus employee to challenge
the treatment of a circus elephant, that it saw “no principled
distinction between the injury that person suffers when
discharges begin polluting the river [as in Laidlaw] and the injury
[the circus worker] allegedly suffers from the mistreatment of the
elephants to which he became emotionally attached during his
tenure at Ringling Bros.—both are part of the aesthetic injury.”134
It is worth questioning whether a plaintiff ’s interest in
the humane treatment of animals is most accurately characterized
as an aesthetic interest. Does watching the suffering of an animal
really provoke the same type of mental or emotional reaction
as, say, watching a tree being cut down?135 If the Supreme Court
explicitly recognized emotional and other psychological injuries
as sufficient for Article III injury, there would be less need to
“twist” animal-welfare claims so that they fit into the Court’s
existing standing jurisprudence.136 Nevertheless, as of now,
some courts’ incorporation of emotional injury into aesthetic
injury in the animal welfare context has brought animal
132 For an example of a case holding that an animal itself did not have
standing, see Tilikum ex rel. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Sea World
Parks & Entm’t, Inc., 842 F. Supp. 2d 1259 (S.D. Cal. 2012), where PETA tried to
assert standing to sue for violations of the Thirteenth Amendment on behalf of captive
whales. The court held that the whales had no standing on redressability grounds.
Tilikum, 842 F. Supp. 2d at 1264.
133 See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528
U.S. 167, 183 (2000); Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp (ADAPSO),
397 U.S. 150, 154 (1970).
134 Am. Soc’y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Ringling Bros. and
Barnum & Bailey Circus (APSCA I), 317 F.3d 334, 338 (D.C. Cir. 2003); see also
Animal Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. Glickman, 154 F.3d 426, 428, 445 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
(finding standing on the basis of plaintiffs’ aesthetic interest in seeing specific
animals); Hill v. Coggins, No. 13-cv-47, 2014 WL 2738664, at *4 (W.D.N.C. June 17,
2014) (“Plaintiffs allege that they previously visited the grizzly bears at the Zoo and
suffered aesthetic and emotional harm from observing the bears living in inhumane
conditions. . . . Such factual allegations are sufficient to allege an injury for purposes of
Article III standing.”).
135 See Krieger, supra note 36, at 404-05.
136 See id. (arguing for a theory of standing based on emotional injury, rather
than injury to aesthetic interests, in animal welfare cases).
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welfare claims into court on the coattails of an injury clearly
recognized by the Supreme Court.
c. Environmental Protection
Plaintiffs suing to protect the environment also face the
challenge of showing that they, as human beings, were harmed.137
In accordance with Supreme Court precedent, lower courts
have accepted injury to aesthetic and recreational interests as
sufficient for injury-in-fact.138 When courts find aesthetic injury,
they often emphasize the connection between a particular
plaintiff and the object of aesthetic interest, so as not to grant
standing to “a roving environmental ombudsman seeking to
right environmental wrongs wherever he might find them.”139
Because aesthetic and recreational interests suffice to create
standing, courts seem to have faced less need to justify a grant
of standing to environmental plaintiffs on the basis of emotional
or psychological harm, and so the latter types of harm are not
usually discussed explicitly in the environmental context. One
exception, in the sense that the case clearly references
psychological consequences, is a 1974 Eighth Circuit case
that found that plaintiffs who lived in the vicinity of
proposed construction had standing to seek to enjoin the
development partly because they stood to lose open space
and natural environment, which “provides aesthetic and
psychological benefit.”140
One type of psychological reaction more commonly
mentioned in the environmental context is fear or concern
about potential environmental consequences.141 The courts are
137 See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972). Justice Douglas’s
dissent in Sierra Club highlights the alternative road (not taken) of holding that the
environment itself could have standing:
The critical question of “standing” would be simplified and also put neatly in
focus if we fashioned a federal rule that allowed environmental issues to be
litigated before federal agencies or federal courts in the name of the
inanimate object about to be despoiled, defaced, or invaded by roads and
bulldozers and where injury is the subject of public outrage.
Id. at 741 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
138 See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Franklin Cty. Power of Illinois, LLC, 546 F.3d 918, 925
(7th Cir. 2008); Am. Canoe Ass’n v. Murphy Farms, Inc., 326 F.3d 505, 517 (4th Cir. 2003).
139 Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 149,
157 (4th Cir. 2000).
140 Coal. for the Env’t v. Volpe, 504 F.2d 156, 167 (8th Cir. 1974).
141 Of course, lower courts have addressed issues related to fear of harm
outside the environmental context. See, e.g., Tomsha v. Gen. Servs. Admin., No. 15-cv-
7326, 2016 WL 3538380, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 21, 2016) (“Plaintiffs’ genuine fears of a
future terrorist attack at One World Trade Center are insufficient to establish
constitutional standing.”); Bernstein v. Kerry, 962 F. Supp. 2d 122 (D.D.C. 2013), aff’d,
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reluctant to grant standing based on fears of future
environmental harm that are insufficiently “concrete and
particularized,”142 but courts have found standing based on
“reasonable” fear, such as concerns about the effects of
polluting discharges.143 It is sometimes unclear how reasonable
fear of future harm interacts with increased risk of harm144 or
with the current violation of aesthetic, recreational, or economic
interests as forms of injury.145 Furthermore, courts addressing
standing based on fear or anxiety about future harm in the
post-Clapper era must contend with that Supreme Court case’s
requirement that injury-in-fact be “certainly impending”146—or
at least that there be a “substantial risk” of its occurrence.147
Adjusting to this standard may require revision of the type of fear
or anxiety that could suffice for standing. As Part II indicates,
however, Clapper does not wholly preclude psychological injury-
in-fact that is based on anticipation of future events.148
d. Discrimination
Discrimination often causes economic harm, but its
effects are also frequently felt in the psyche,149 and
psychological injury has on some occasions been held to suffice
for standing in discrimination suits. The Second Circuit, for
instance, found that a plaintiff had “standing under Article III to
raise a claim of hostile work environment to redress psychological
584 F. App’x 7 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (finding that American citizens living in Jerusalem could
not show injury-in-fact based on fear of terrorism; the case was affirmed on redressability
grounds).
142 See, e.g., Coal. for Mercury-Free Drugs v. Sebelius, 671 F.3d 1275, 1280
(D.C. Cir. 2012) (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)).
143 E.g., Am. Canoe Ass’n v. Murphy Farms, Inc., 326 F.3d 505, 517-18 (4th
Cir. 2003); Gaston Copper, 204 F.3d at 157.
144 See Gaston Copper, 204 F.3d at 160 (“Threats or increased risk thus
constitutes cognizable harm.”). For a discussion of standing based on risk of harm, see
Hessick, supra note 107, at 67.
145 For example, the Fourth Circuit in American Canoe Association mentioned
“fear and concern” as bases for standing but also noted that this fear affected the
plaintiffs’ aesthetic, recreational, and at times economic interests, so it is difficult to
tell whether fear alone would have sufficed. Am. Canoe Ass’n, 326 F.3d at 520.
146 Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1141 (2013) (quoting
Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990)).
147 See Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2341 (2014)
(quoting Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1147, 1150 n.5).
148 See infra Section II.A.3.
149 See Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (stating that
school segregation “generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the
community that may affect [schoolchildren’s] hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever
to be undone”).
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and emotional injuries”150 through a Title VII suit. Sometimes
emotional, physical, and economic harms are found sufficient in
combination, as in a Fair Housing Act case in which a plaintiff in
Pomona, California alleged that the director of her neighborhood
association had made racially derogatory comments at an
association meeting with members of the city’s police department
in attendance.151 A California district court held that the plaintiff
had standing due to “[t]he physical and emotional upset that
accompanied the stigma of being considered inferior by the
director of [the plaintiff ’s] own neighborhood association, as well
as by the city that continued to support the association.”152
To sum up, this examination of several contexts in
which psychological harm has appeared in the lower federal
courts has not covered all the applicable subjects. For example,
some cases discuss psychological harm resulting from the theft
of personal information153 and from fear of terrorism.154 The
discussion in this section, however, has focused on a variety of
lower courts’ responses to psychological harm in the constitutional
standing arena. These courts’ analyses of psychological harm can
serve as the basis for a clearer framework to adjudicate these
claims, of the type this article seeks to provide. Before turning to
this task, this section explores the relationship between Article III
standing doctrine and tort claims that are connected to
psychological harm or emotional distress.
Cases involving psychological harm may raise unresolved
questions in the Article III standing context, but such issues are
regularly litigated in the torts context. All states have recognized
the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), and
all but two permit recovery for the negligent infliction of
emotional distress (NIED).155 These torts provide redress for
plaintiffs who have been subjected to “severe emotional
150 Leibovitz v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 252 F.3d 179, 184 (2d Cir. 2001); see also
Clayton v. White Hall Sch. Dist., 875 F.2d 676, 679 (8th Cir. 1989) (indicating that “[i]t
is an emotional or psychological injury to the plaintiff herself which is the gravamen of
[a hostile work environment claim]” (quoting Clayton v. White Hall Sch. Dist., 778 F.2d
457, 459 (8th Cir. 1985))).
151 Inland Mediation Bd. v. City of Pomona, 158 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1131-32
(C.D. Cal. 2001).
152 Id. at 1138. In another case, a court rejected psychological harm as injury-
in-fact in a discrimination case on the ground that “injury of this nature, if deemed
sufficient to confer standing, inevitably will invite friction with First Amendment
freedoms.” Jones v. Deutsch, 715 F. Supp. 1237, 1246 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
153 Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1142 (9th Cir. 2010).
154 Tomsha v. Gen. Servs. Admin., No. 15-cv-7326, 2016 WL 3538380 (S.D.N.Y.
June 21, 2016); Bernstein v. Kerry, 962 F. Supp. 2d 122, 127 (D.D.C. 2013), aff’d, 584 F.
App’x 7 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
155 John J. Kircher, The Four Faces of Tort Law: Liability for Emotional
Harm, 90 MARQ. L. REV. 789, 806, 809 (2007).
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distress” as a result of “extreme and outrageous” conduct (for
IIED)156 and who have experienced “emotional distress” as a
result of negligent conduct provided that certain conditions are
satisfied (for NIED).157 The conditions for NIED recovery vary
from state to state, but they include the requirement that the
plaintiff suffer physical impact (in a few states), experience a
physical manifestation of emotional distress (in a majority of
states), and be in the “zone of danger” when the tort occurred (in
several states).158 These conditions help to provide evidence
that a plaintiff has in fact suffered emotional distress159 and to
limit liability to a specified circle of potentially harmed
individuals. The “extreme and outrageous” requirement in the
IIED context ensures, as the Restatement (Second) of Torts
suggests, that not every form of psychological harm is
actionable in tort: “There is no occasion for the law to intervene
in every case where some one’s feelings are hurt.”160
These tort claims are usually litigated in state courts,
which are not bound by Article III standing requirements in the
absence of a relevant state provision or decision so specifying.161
However, tort (or tort-like) claims also appear in federal
courts—for example, in diversity cases, as a matter of
supplemental jurisdiction, or in § 1983 actions against state
officials.162 There is not a great deal of litigation on standing
and tort claims involving psychological or emotional harm, but
156 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
157 Id. § 313.
158 Kircher, supra note 155, at 806-31.
159 See Vance v. Vance, 408 A.2d 728, 733-34 (Md. 1979) (describing NIED
standards “formulated with the overall purpose in mind of requiring objective evidence
to guard against feigned claims”); see also Eugene Kontorovich, The Mitigation of
Emotional Distress Damages, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 491, 493 (2001) (noting that “the
inchoate, subjective nature of [emotional distress] claims has created significant
problems of measurement and proof” ).
160 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d. (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
161 See, e.g., New York State Club Ass’n, Inc. v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 8
n.2 (1988) (“[T]he special limitations that Article III of the Constitution imposes on the
jurisdiction of the federal courts are not binding on the state courts.”); Price v. King (Ex
parte King), 50 So.3d 1056 (Ala. 2010) (stating that the Alabama Supreme Court had
adopted a test for standing based on the U.S. Supreme Court’s standard); William A.
Fletcher, The “Case or Controversy” Requirement in State Court Adjudication of
Federal Questions, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 263, 265 (1990) (proposing that “[s]tate courts
should be required to adhere to Article III ‘case or controversy’ requirements whenever
they adjudicate questions of federal law”).
162 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) (authorizing civil actions against state officials for
certain deprivations “of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws”); see Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 253 (1978) (holding that § 1983 “was
intended to ‘[create] a species of tort liability’ in favor of persons who are deprived of
‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured’ to them by the Constitution” (alteration in
original) (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417 (1976))).
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a few examples highlight courts’ application of tort principles,
or a state’s particular tort law, to standing questions.
Some federal courts have turned to tort law to determine
whether a particular claim of emotional harm is cognizable. For
instance, in Smith v. Frye, the Fourth Circuit in 2007 reviewed
a § 1983 action from a candidate for circuit clerk who alleged
that his mother had been illegally fired from her position as
magistrate court clerk.163 The plaintiff claimed that his mother
had been fired after he entered his candidacy for circuit clerk
against the incumbent, who was his mother’s colleague.164
According to the plaintiff, he had “suffered the injuries of
indignity, embarrassment, and emotional distress because he
felt responsible for his mother’s discharge.”165 The Fourth
Circuit noted that § 1983 “was intended to create a species of
tort liability,”166 and so the district court was correct to apply
the “venerable common-law tort principle that ‘one cannot
collect for emotional damage or humiliation occasioned by
harm done to a family member absent fairly particular
circumstances.’”167 In light of this principle, the Fourth Circuit
“agree[d] with the district court that ‘[a]llowing an adult son to
collect for emotional damages and humiliation resulting from
his mother’s discharge from her employment casts the net of
possible liability too broadly.’”168 Accordingly, the Fourth
Circuit concluded that plaintiff ’s “emotional distress is
insufficient as an Article III injury in fact.”169 Here, the Fourth
Circuit drew on tort law to reject a claim of constitutional
standing that was based on psychological harm.
Another example of an approach to standing that is
based on elements of tort law appears in a 2013 case in which
female ambulance workers sued their employers in Illinois
federal district court.170 The workers alleged violations of Title
VII as well as state law negligence claims, which included
163 Smith v. Frye, 488 F.3d 263 (4th Cir. 2007).
164 Id. at 265.
165 Id. at 272. The plaintiff claimed, as another basis for standing, that his
First Amendment rights had been chilled by the allegedly retaliatory firing of his
mother, but the court rejected this ground for injury-in-fact on the basis that any
alleged retaliatory action was taken against the plaintiff ’s mother, not against the
plaintiff himself. See id. at 272-73.
166 Id. at 273 (quoting Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 34 (1983)).
167 Id. The court cited a relevant provision of West Virginia law (the law of the
state where the claim was brought) as an “example” of a state law IIED claim, the
elements of which the plaintiff could not satisfy. Id. at 273 n.9.
168 Id. at 273-74 (quoting Smith v. Frye, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39909, at *14
(N.D. W. Va. June 14, 2006)).
169 Id. at 274.
170 Volling v. Antioch Rescue Squad, 999 F. Supp. 2d 991 (N.D. Ill. 2013).
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allegations that harassment by individuals whom the
defendants had negligently supervised had caused the plaintiffs
“emotional distress, severe embarrassment, pain, suffering,
humiliation, fear, anxiety, damage and risk of damage to their
careers and reputations, damage to their standing in the
community, loss of enjoyment of life, inconvenience and other non-
pecuniary losses.”171 In response to the question “whether some of
these injuries ‘count’ for purposes of the standing analysis, to the
extent they are purely emotional or reputational in nature,” the
court turned to Illinois law and found that negligence in Illinois
“is actionable if it directly causes emotional distress even
without any physical symptoms.”172 The court therefore found
that the plaintiffs had satisfied Article III’s requirements.173 Here,
the court seemed to be suggesting that the sufficiency of an injury
for Article III purposes could be influenced by the standards for
emotional harm claims under state law.
When federal courts assess tort claims involving
psychological harm, they need not turn to the particulars of tort
law to assess whether psychological harm counts as injury-in-
fact. A different approach appears in the Ninth Circuit case
Chaudhry v. City of Los Angeles, brought by relatives of a man
shot and killed by the police.174 In Chaudhry, the relatives
brought negligence and IIED claims, as well as other claims, such
as for violations of substantive due process under § 1983.175 The
Ninth Circuit, instead of relying on the specifics of tort law,
simply indicated that the relatives had “suffered emotional
harm (injury in fact).”176 Chaudhry highlights the possibility for
a court to hold that emotional harm is sufficient for Article III
injury based on general principles of constitutional standing,
rather than turning to aspects of tort law to assess whether a
plaintiff ’s claim is cognizable.
Tort issues may additionally enter the domain of Article
III standing in federal court through courts’ inquiries into
whether plaintiffs have suffered an “invasion of a legally
protected interest,” which is part of the injury-in-fact inquiry
laid out in Lujan.177 This subject has also not provoked a great
171 Id. at 999.
172 Id.
173 Id. at 998-1000.
174 Chaudhry v. City of Los Angeles, 751 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2014); see supra
note 1 and accompanying text.
175 Chaudhry, 751 F.3d at 1101.
176 Id. at 1109.
177 Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). This article’s proposal
incorporates the suggestion that cognizable psychological harm must be a response to
the alleged violation of a legally protected interest. See infra Section II.A.2. The inquiry
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deal of litigation, but some courts have declined to find injury
partially because the claimed psychological harm was not
recognized under state tort law and so did not stem from the
violation of a legally protected interest.178
In sum, federal courts adjudicating constitutional
standing cases involving psychological harm have at times turned
to tort law to clarify the bounds of cognizable injuries. Regardless
of whether the legal inquiry undertaken in any particular case
was correct, these cases speak to the possibility of drawing into
the standing inquiry tort principles that both recognize and
limit liability for emotional suffering. Such a possibility is
explored at greater length in what follows.




This article’s proposed test for whether injury-in-fact
based on psychological harm is cognizable requires two conditions
to be met. First, the psychological harm must respond to the
alleged violation of a legally protected interest. Second, there
must be a sufficient nexus between the alleged violation of this
interest and the plaintiff ’s particular circumstances, so that it is
reasonable to think that such a plaintiff would be especially
likely to suffer psychological harm in the situation at hand.
Why should courts recognize psychological harm as
injury-in-fact at all? Another option, after all, would be simply
to deny that “Psychic Injury”179 counts for Article III standing.
One reason is that psychological harm is, in fact, injurious.
Citizens’ senses of sadness, anguish, anger, anxiety, fright,
humiliation, and so on play an important role in people’s lives.
into whether a plaintiff has suffered a violation of a “legally protected interest” could
also be viewed as part of an investigation into the existence of a cause of action. See
infra Section II.B.1.
178 E.g., Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 25 (D.D.C. 2010) (declining to
find Article III injury on the part of the father of an individual allegedly placed on a
U.S. government “kill list” for terrorist activities partly on the grounds that the “D.C.
wrongful death statute does not provide a basis for plaintiff ’s alleged legally protected
interest in preserving his relationship with his adult son”); In re Tri-State Crematory
Litig., 215 F.R.D. 660, 685 (N.D. Ga. 2003) (stating that plaintiffs did not have
standing to bring an NIED claim because Georgia law on NIED required an impact on
the plaintiff leading to physical injury).
179 Hein v. Freedom From Religious Found., 551 U.S. 587, 620 (2007) (Scalia,
J., concurring).
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They can affect people as much as the (sometimes small)
economic and physical harms that courts are willing to find
sufficient for standing.180 In fact, it is plausible to think that
part of the actual harm suffered when plaintiffs are
economically or physically hurt—though by no means the
entirety of the harm—consists of its effect on the human
psyche. Paying women less for equal work, for example,
undoubtedly inflicts economic harm. But part of the reason
why this economic injury hurts women is that it reflects a view
of women’s capacities and achievements that many find
humiliating or otherwise psychologically disturbing.
It may be objected that even if psychological harm is
morally relevant, law is not morality. After all, it is morally
significant whether passersby facing little risk are willing to
rescue others from mortal danger, but courts have historically
declined to recognize a general duty to rescue for the purposes of
imposing tort liability.181 Psychological harm, however, is not alien
to the law. As indicated above, psychological and emotional injuries
are recognized in several legal contexts (such as IIED and NIED
claims, workers’ compensation, sentencing, and antidiscrimination
law).182 Damages are sometimes awarded on the basis of emotional
distress.183 These forms of recognition of psychological harm seem
to reflect an understanding that plaintiffs’ grievances can
legitimately include psychological or emotional damage. Put
differently, psychological harm can be “concrete.”184
This argument in favor of acknowledging psychological
harm as injury-in-fact is partly an expressive view, in the sense
that recognition of psychological harm as injury-in-fact would
180 See Sprint Commc’ns Co., L.P. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 554 U.S. 269, 289
(2008) (suggesting that a dollar or two could suffice for Article III standing); see also
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 127 (1998) (Stevens, J., concurring)
(“Yet the Court fails to specify why payment to respondent—even if only a peppercorn—
would redress respondent’s injuries, while payment to the Treasury does not.”).
181 See, e.g., L.S. Ayres & Co. v. Hicks, 40 N.E.2d 334, 337 (Ind. 1942). The “no
duty to rescue” rule has been modified in several jurisdictions. See, e.g., Jennifer L.
Groninger, No Duty to Rescue: Can Americans Really Leave a Victim Lying in the
Street? What Is Left of the American Rule, and Will It Survive Unabated?, 26 PEPP. L.
REV. 353 (1999).
182 See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
183 See supra note 155 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Stewart A.
Sutton, Emotional Distress Damages—Recoverable in Legal Malpractice Actions, MD.
B.J. 52 (Sept./Oct. 2010) (discussing recovery for emotional distress in legal malpractice
cases); Douglas J. Whaley, Paying for the Agony: The Recovery of Emotional Distress
Damages in Contract Actions, 26 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 935 (1992) (discussing recovery for
emotional distress in contract actions and limitations on such recovery).
184 See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016) (“A ‘concrete’ injury
must be ‘de facto’; that is, it must actually exist. . . . When we have used the adjective
‘concrete,’ we have meant to convey the usual meaning of the term—‘real,’ and not
‘abstract.’”).
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appropriately send the message that psychological damage is a
real and valid form of injury. But expressiveness need not be at
odds with practical effects; explicit recognition of psychological
harm as injury-in-fact could make a genuine difference to
citizens’ ability to obtain judicial redress. A first reason for courts
to cognize psychological harm as injury-in-fact, therefore, is that
doing so would reflect citizens’ actual experiences of harm. A
second and related reason ties the point about citizens’
experiences of harm to the distinct values embedded in
constitutional standing doctrine.
Specifically, the injury-in-fact requirement has frequently
been defended on the basis that, in the words of Justice Kennedy’s
concurrence in Lujan, it
preserves the vitality of the adversarial process by assuring both that
the parties before the court have an actual, as opposed to professed,
stake in the outcome, and that “the legal questions presented . . . will
be resolved, not in the rarified atmosphere of a debating society, but in
a concrete factual context conducive to a realistic appreciation of the
consequences of judicial action.”185
The “concrete adverseness” rationale for the injury-in-fact
requirement has been criticized for failing to acknowledge the
reality of interest-group litigation. Why would a highly motivated
interest group be less likely to present a pointed piece of advocacy
that highlights the salient issues than someone who simply
happens to meet the injury-in-fact requirements?186 Indeed, the
Supreme Court has avoided casting “concrete adverseness” as the
be-all and end-all of injury-in-fact. As the Court stated in a 1982
case, the “concrete adverseness” that “sharpens the presentation of
issues, is the anticipated consequence of proceedings commenced
185 Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 581 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(quoting Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, 454
U.S. 464, 472 (1982)); see also Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 517 (2007) (“At
bottom, ‘the gist of the question of standing’ is whether petitioners have ‘such a
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness
which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for
illumination.’” (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962))).
186 See, e.g., Elliott, supra note 17, at 474-75; Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional
Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 YALEL.J. 1363, 1385 (1973) (“[T]here is no reason to
believe that litigants with a ‘personal interest’ will present constitutional issues any
more sharply or ably than the Sierra Club or the ACLU.”). Indeed, Justice Scalia made
a similar point in an article on standing published before he became a Supreme Court
Justice. See Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the
Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 891 (1983) (“Often the very best
adversaries are national organizations such as the NAACP or the American Civil
Liberties Union that have a keen interest in the abstract question at issue in the case,
but no ‘concrete injury in fact’ whatever.”); see also Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to
Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 225 (1974) (rejecting the argument that standing was
present simply because “the adverse parties sharply conflicted in their interests and
views and were supported by able briefs and arguments”).
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by one who has been injured in fact; it is not a permissible
substitute for the showing of injury itself.”187
Certain aspects of the “concrete adverseness” justification
for the injury-in-fact requirement, however, are more defensible
than others. In particular, plaintiffs who can plead a specific
injury, even if their advocacy is no stronger than that of other
potential plaintiffs, serve an important role in the judicial
process. These plaintiffs’ situations can highlight the precise
factual consequences of judicial action and thereby enhance
courts’ adjudication of legal issues, as well as other actors’
comprehension of what has been decided.
For example, a court’s analysis of the specific contours
of a claim that a certain practice (such as a debt collection or
labor practice) is illegal is greatly bolstered by the ability to
evaluate a particular plaintiff ’s factual circumstances: X
individual or group was subject to Y conduct, which X claims
violates law or regulation Z; Z has previously been interpreted
to prohibit or permit A, B, and C types of conduct, which are
analogous to X’s situation in D and E ways, but not analogous
in F and G ways. The same is true of challenges to regulatory
statutes or administrative regulations (say, an environmental
or health and safety provision). The claim that an individual
wishes to engage in a certain course of conduct, but is blocked
because of a specific provision, which also has the effect of
precluding other particular types of conduct, can significantly
aid a court’s determination of whether the provision passes
muster, in a way that the abstract assertion that, for example,
the provision is unconstitutional would not. Furthermore, such
particularity can help members of the public, including future
litigants and members of the bar, to gain a better-developed
sense of what a court has done and why. Put differently,
plaintiffs with injuries that affect them in distinctive ways can
draw attention to the consequences of judicial action. If
plaintiff X wins, then plaintiffs Y and Z would likely also win,
while plaintiffs A and B would likely lose. Making plain the
specific effects of judicial decisionmaking can help to elucidate
the scope of rulings and underscore the ramifications of legal
interventions.188
187 Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 486 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962))
(citation omitted).
188 Of course, courts’ focus on specific factual scenarios also frequently
differentiates the judiciary from the legislative and executive branches of government.
This separation-of-powers rationale for the injury-in-fact requirement is considered
below. See infra notes 199-200 and accompanying text.
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And to the extent that the injury-in-fact requirement
helps to deepen and enrich the adjudicative process, the
explicit recognition of psychological harm as injury-in-fact
furthers this goal. The factual dimensions of a dispute include
litigants’ psychological experiences. People’s senses of sadness,
humiliation, fear, and so on can lend as much concrete, stakes-
highlighting detail to a case as their economic or physical
injuries. Given that the standing inquiry ought to further the
aim of enhancing adjudication and comprehension of the
judicial process’s results, this inquiry should take into account
plaintiffs’ psychological and emotional reactions.
Explicit recognition of psychological harm as injury-in-
fact, then, would respond appropriately to the genuine character
of psychological harm and would also comport with an important
value embedded in the injury-in-fact requirement. A third reason
to support such recognition is that psychological harm is a
common consequence of intangible injuries that some courts
have already, and plausibly, accepted as sufficient for injury-in-
fact—notably, aesthetic, stigmatic, and reputational injury.
These injuries could potentially be considered damaging
independently of their psychological effects. For example, one
could hold that reputational injury is deleterious simply because
other members of the community have developed a lower opinion
of the plaintiff. Such an approach is not theoretically impossible,
but it involves an overly abstract conceptualization of recognized
injuries that is out of step with the lived experience of plaintiffs
suffering these injuries and with connections that courts have
drawn between these injuries and psychological harm.
A well-known passage189 from Brown v. Board of Education
highlights the interconnectedness between psychological harm and
related injuries. “To separate [African-American children] from
others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their
race,” the Supreme Court stated in Brown, “generates a feeling
of inferiority as to their status in the community that may
affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be
undone.”190 Segregation is plausibly viewed as a form of
stigmatic injury, which some courts of appeals have recognized
as injury-in-fact,191 and which the Supreme Court has, at the
very least, not rejected.192 Stigmatic injury, as the passage from
Brown suggests, is intimately connected to the personal
189 See Kenji Yoshino, The Anti-Humiliation Principle and Same-Sex
Marriage, 123 YALE L.J. 3076, 3088 (2014).
190 Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
191 See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
192 See supra notes 72-79 and accompanying text.
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feelings of those subject to it; a description of the nature of
stigma seems difficult to construct without referencing its
likely effects on people’s mental states. This is not to say that
segregation, or stigma more generally, would not be wrong if its
victims suffered no mental or emotional harm. But it is to say
that in the ordinary course of life, it would be natural for a
person wishing to provide an adequate characterization of
stigma’s influence and its problematic nature to mention the
psychological consequences for the stigmatized.
Aesthetic injury serves as another example. Without
delving deeply into aesthetic theory, an aesthetic experience, as
an intuitive matter, involves an interplay between the object of
aesthetic interest and the mental life of the observer. To say, as
courts have done, that plaintiffs have “aesthetic” or
“conservational” interests in “an area of great natural beauty”193
is to call attention to the positive impact of that area on the
plaintiffs’ inner experience, as well as the mental or emotional
loss that would attend the area’s destruction. In other words,
this kind of aesthetic injury plausibly affects plaintiffs partly
by inflicting psychological harm. Consequently, the courts’
willingness to cognize aesthetic injury should support an
acknowledgement of psychological harm as a legitimate form of
legally redressable damage.
The broader point is that it would be arbitrary to reject
psychological harm while explicitly accepting related intangible
injuries.194 This point does not apply only at a theoretical level;
some courts have linked psychological harms and other
noneconomic injuries.195 The Supreme Court’s recent confirmation
in Spokeo v. Robins that intangible harm may count as Article III
injury renders all the more pertinent the connections between
psychological harm and various forms of intangible harm.196
193 Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 728 (1972).
194 For further discussion of these intangible injuries, see supra notes 62-89
and accompanying text.
195 E.g., Denney v. Deutsche Bank AG, 443 F.3d 253, 265 (2d Cir. 2006)
(“[A]esthetic, emotional or psychological harms also suffice for standing purposes.”);
Coal. for the Env’t v. Volpe, 504 F.2d 156, 167 (8th Cir. 1974) (referring to the
impending destruction of a natural area that “provides aesthetic and psychological
benefit”). Other courts have distinguished between “abstract psychic harm” and related
injuries. E.g., Sierra Club v. Franklin Cty. Power of Illinois, LLC, 564 F.3d 918, 926
(7th Cir. 2008) (finding standing for an environmental organization to sue a power
company because of reduced aesthetic and recreational uses of the area, and noting
that this was not a case of “abstract psychic harm”). But as argued below, see infra
Section II.A.3, it is possible for courts to cognize certain types of psychological harm
without cognizing “abstract psychic harm.”
196 Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016).
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The discussion above has provided reasons to favor
courts’ explicit recognition of psychological harm as injury-in-
fact. The approach advanced in this article, however, also
supports certain limitations on the cognizability of psychological
harm. One reason, though not the only one, is to be responsive to
the structure of courts’ existing standing doctrine and thereby
to advance “reflective equilibrium” between courts’ approaches
to standing and more general principles. Courts often cite the
potential for a significant increase in the number of injured
plaintiffs as a ground for not recognizing psychological harm in
a given case,197 and courts that have accepted psychological
injury-in-fact and related injuries often seek to cabin the range
of cognizable injury.198 Forced to choose between unlimited
endorsement of psychological injury-in-fact and unequivocal
rejection of psychological harm, most courts would likely choose
the latter. The better option, this article argues, is for courts
not to face this choice.
Further, limits on psychological harm-based standing—
and standing more generally—advance principles embedded in
constitutional standing doctrine. The discussion above suggested
that there is value in having courts adjudicate legal issues not
in the abstract, but with reference to specific factual contexts.
This idea, while it supports the recognition of psychological
harm as injury-in-fact, also suggests the value of a limiting
principle. If any plaintiff could request a court ruling on the
legality of a law, regulation, or course of conduct, then lawsuits
would not be limited to those in which a more realistic and
nuanced factual record is likely to develop. Moreover, the notion
that the federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and
that an understanding of the proper parties to a federal lawsuit
helps to enforce these limitations, is firmly embedded in U.S.
constitutional structure and Supreme Court jurisprudence,
even if the elements of standing doctrine as we know them
today emerged in the second half of the twentieth century.199
These limitations on federal jurisdiction are rooted, for
example, in considerations of the legislature’s distinctive role
197 E.g., Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 107 (1998) (“By
the mere bringing of his suit, every plaintiff demonstrates his belief that a favorable
judgment will make him happier.”); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 756 (1984) (“All such
persons could claim the same sort of abstract stigmatic injury respondents assert in
their first claim of injury. A black person in Hawaii could challenge the grant of a tax
exemption to a racially discriminatory school in Maine.”).
198 See infra notes 234-242 and accompanying text.
199 For a brief overview of the recent history of standing doctrine, see Fallon,
Jr., supra note 34, at 1064-68.
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or the maintenance of executive enforcement discretion.200
These restrictions ought to be taken seriously, though they
should motivate not a wholesale rejection of psychological
injury-in-fact, but rather a focus on how courts can differentiate
between cognizable and noncognizable claims.
There are also reasons specifically related to psychological
harm to endorse limitations on injury-in-fact. For example,
although it is certainly possible to offer evidence of psychological
harm (as plaintiffs bringing tort claims may do),201 cases
involving psychological harm raise evidentiary questions made
harder by the absence of, say, a bank statement or a severed
limb. In fact, limitations on liability for NIED tort claims seem to
be based partially on concerns about showing that mental harm is
genuine.202 Although it would not be reasonable to dismiss
psychological harm as impossible to prove, it is reasonable to
acknowledge a need for additional evidentiary devices in the area
of psychological harm. This article’s endorsement of limitations on
the cognizability of psychological harm therefore stems from a
desire both to speak to existing doctrine and to acknowledge the
concerns that underlie this doctrine.
2. Psychological Injury-in-Fact and Legally Protected
Interests
The first part of this article’s proposed framework is
that psychological harm must be a response to the alleged
violation of a legally protected interest (enshrined in the
Constitution, a relevant statute, or the common law). This aspect
of the test is grounded in the Supreme Court’s statement of
Article III standing doctrine in Lujan: “the plaintiff must have
suffered an ‘injury in fact’—an invasion of a legally protected
interest which is (a) concrete and particularized; and (b) ‘actual
or imminent, not “conjectural” or “hypothetical.”’”203 Only
200 See Allen, 468 U.S. at 760-61; Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 576-77
(1992).
201 See Robert J. Rhee, A Principled Solution for Negligent Infliction of
Emotional Distress Claims, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 805, 832 (2004) (“[C]ourts have become
more comfortable with the nature of mental injuries as the psychiatric and
psychological fields have progressed.”).
202 See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 54 (5th ed. 1991) (noting “the danger that claims of mental harm will be falsified or
imagined”); Kircher, supra note 155, at 810 (“[A]t the root of these rules [for NIED
recovery] is judicial concern over the genuineness of claims for negligently caused
emotional distress.”).
203 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (emphasis added) (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S.
737, 751 (1984); Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990) (footnote omitted)
(citations omitted)). The Court reiterated this standard in Spokeo v. Robins. See
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016).
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plaintiffs who allege that they are suffering psychological harm as
a result of the violation of an interest that the law recognizes as
valid should be able to satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement.
This principle can be illustrated with reference to the
1998 D.C. Circuit case Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v.
Glickman, where the court pointed out the significance of the
“legally protected interest” aspect of the standing inquiry.204 In
this case, the plaintiffs sued the U.S. Department of Agriculture
for promulgating regulations that allegedly “permit[ted] dealers,
exhibitors, and research facilities to keep primates under
inhumane conditions.”205 These regulations, the plaintiffs
argued, violated the Department of Agriculture’s “statutory
mandate” under the Animal Welfare Act.206 The plaintiffs claimed
that they had standing because they “suffered aesthetic injury
during their regular visits to animal exhibitions when they
observed primates living under such conditions.”207 The D.C.
Circuit, sitting en banc, found standing for one plaintiff on the
basis of this claimed injury.208 A vigorous dissent, however,
charged the majority with ignoring the “ill-defined and
essentially subjective nature of the asserted injury,” stating
that “[a]ccording to the majority’s theory, a sadist with an
interest in seeing animals kept under inhumane conditions is
constitutionally injured when he views animals kept under
humane conditions.”209
As the Glickman majority suggested, however, the “legally
protected interest” part of the standing inquiry prevents plaintiffs
concerned with animal welfare from being identically situated to
sadistic plaintiffs for the purposes of meeting Article III injury-in-
fact requirements.210 After all, the psychological harm suffered by
plaintiffs unable to experience animal suffering does not respond
to the violation of a legally protected interest.211 That is, while the
204 Animal Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. Glickman, 154 F.3d 426, 431-32 (D.C.
Cir. 1998).
205 Id. at 428.
206 Id.
207 Id.
208 Id. at 431-32. The D.C. Circuit granted rehearing en banc limited to the
question of this plaintiff ’s standing. See id. at 431.
209 Id. at 448-49 (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
210 Id. at 434 n.7 (majority opinion).
211 Glickman, 154 F.3d at 434 n.7. Sadistic plaintiffs might successfully assert
Article III injury-in-fact under certain circumstances. For example, plaintiffs with
religious beliefs that had sadistic implications could assert standing to sue under the Free
Exercise Clause. But in that case, the relevant protected legal interest would be the
interest in practicing their religion, not sadism per se. The point here is that sadistic
plaintiffs would not be able to assert viable claims of injury-in-fact based on psychological
harm simply because plaintiffs concerned about animal welfare would be able to do so—in
other words, the two categories of plaintiffs would not be identically situated.
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law protects animal welfare, it does not protect cruelty to animals.
To take another example, psychological harm resulting from
being unable to attend a desegregated public school would pass
the “legally protected interest” prong of the test, whereas
psychological harm resulting from attending a desegregated
public school would not.212
In determining that a particular psychological harm
stems from a legally protected interest, courts can look to the
Constitution; for example, they can indicate that an interest is
protected under the Equal Protection Clause213 or the
Establishment Clause.214 They can also look to a relevant
statute, such as environmental statutes when plaintiffs allege
psychological harm due to the destruction of the natural
environment, animal-welfare statutes when plaintiffs allege
psychological harm as a result of harm to animals, or
antidiscrimination statutes when plaintiffs allege emotional
distress as a consequence of a hostile working environment.215
Alternatively, courts can look to the common law of a relevant
jurisdiction.216 These inquiries will not necessarily be
straightforward; there may be disagreement about whether the
violated interest giving rise to psychological harm falls within
the ambit of the pertinent constitutional, statutory, or common
law provision, and parties can argue about whether this is the
case when the harm is understood at different levels of
212 See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 756 (1984) (recognizing injury-in-fact for
one of plaintiffs’ claims of injury, on the basis that “children’s diminished ability to
receive an education in a racially integrated school[ ] is[ ] . . . not only judicially
cognizable but . . . [is] one of the most serious injuries recognized in our legal system”
(citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Bob Jones Univ. v. United
States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983))). However, the Court in Allen v. Wright did not find the
Article III causation requirement to be satisfied with respect to this injury.
213 See Allen, 468 U.S. at 756-57 (citing Brown, 347 U.S. 483) (drawing on
Brown v. Board of Education to conclude that “children’s diminished ability to receive
an education in a racially integrated school” is judicially cognizable).
214 Cf. Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp (ADAPSO), 397 U.S.
150, 154 (1970) (stating that “[a] person or a family may have a spiritual stake in First
Amendment values sufficient to give standing to raise issues concerning the
Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause”).
215 Cf. Leibovitz v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 252 F.3d 179, 182, 188 (2d Cir. 2001)
(citing Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65-66 (1986)) (determining that
plaintiff had suffered a cognizable injury as a result of being situated in an allegedly
hostile work environment and noting that this injury could be remedied through a
damages award because noneconomic injury resulting from such an environment was
actionable under Title VII). Courts could also draw on tort statutes, as in Al-Aulaqi v.
Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 25 (D.D.C. 2010) (looking to the D.C. wrongful death statute
to determine whether a father could sue on the basis of his emotional distress).
216 E.g., Smith v. Frye, 488 F.3d 263, 273 (4th Cir. 2007) (finding that a son’s
emotional distress was insufficient for injury-in-fact because of the “venerable common-
law tort principle that ‘one cannot collect for emotional damage or humiliation occasioned
by harm done to a family member absent fairly particular circumstances’” (quoting Smith
v. Frye, No. 06-cv-0014, 2006 WL 4757805, at *4 (N.D. W. Va. June 14, 2006))).
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generality. But this type of inquiry is neither impossible nor
unprecedented. In fact, the “zone of interests” inquiry, long
considered to be a component of “prudential” standing—an
inquiry that asks “whether the interest sought to be protected
by the complainant is arguably within the zone of interests to
be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional
guarantee in question”217—can serve as a model.218
The “legally protected interest” prong seeks to bolster
the legitimacy of courts’ distinctions between psychological
harm that is cognizable and psychological harm that is not.
Courts need not write on a blank slate when they address the
cognizability of psychological harm; they can draw on previous
understandings hashed out by Congress and other courts. This
approach is especially valuable in the area of psychological harm,
where concerns about the subjectivity of particular psychological
reactions frequently arise.219
The article now turns to a discussion of the second
proposed constraint on the cognizability of psychological harm:
the particularity inquiry.
3. The Particularity Inquiry
The second prong of the article’s proposed test is that in
order for psychological harm to be cognizable as injury-in-fact,
there must be a sufficient nexus between the alleged violation
of the legally protected interest and the plaintiff ’s particular
circumstances, so that it is reasonable to think that such a
plaintiff would be especially likely to suffer psychological harm
in the situation at hand.
The particularity inquiry is motivated by the following
factors. First, it aims to track potential plaintiffs who are most
likely to have suffered psychological harm as a consequence of
the alleged legal violation. In this sense, it is an evidentiary
217 ADAPSO, 397 U.S. at 153.
218 See infra note 268 for further discussion of the “zone of interests” inquiry.
219 See Animal Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. Glickman, 154 F.3d 426, 448-49 (D.C.
Cir. 1998) (Sentelle, J., dissenting); see also Mangual v. Rotger-Sabat, 317 F.3d 45, 56-
57 (1st Cir. 2003) (“A plaintiff’s subjective and irrational fear of prosecution is not
enough to confer standing under Article III . . . .”); City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461
U.S. 95, 107 n.8 (1983) (“It is the reality of the threat of repeated injury that is relevant
to the standing inquiry, not the plaintiff’s subjective apprehensions.”). It may be asked
whether the plaintiffs in Brown, if they had alleged psychological harm as a
consequence of segregation, would have been able to meet the first prong of the
standing inquiry endorsed here. A plausible response is “yes,” since these plaintiffs
would have asserted a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, and their interest in
equal protection was legally protected, even if it had previously been interpreted not to
require desegregation.
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device that places emphasis on plaintiffs’ capacity to show courts
that the psychological harm they allege is unlikely to be feigned.
Courts in constitutional standing cases do not generally
acknowledge explicitly that they are concerned about evidence of
plaintiffs’ injuries, but such evidentiary concerns seem to underlie
at least some skepticism about psychological harm as a legally
cognizable injury more broadly.220 The particularity inquiry
aims, in part, to address these concerns.
Second, and relatedly, the particularity analysis—as
with its cousins in tort law, such as many states’ requirement
that NIED plaintiffs be located in the “zone of danger” when
the tortious conduct took place in order to recover221—tracks in
a rough sense the “reasonable foreseeability” of plaintiffs’
psychological harm. To the extent that a limiting principle is
needed to circumscribe standing on the basis of psychological
harm, it is most appropriate and fair to both plaintiffs and
defendants to restrict standing to those whose psychological
harm could reasonably have been foreseen by the defendants
before they took the challenged action. If society wishes to use
the legal system to encourage actors to prioritize the avoidance
of certain types of anticipated harm, then the circle of
jurisdiction should be drawn in a way that seeks to capture
plaintiffs who have suffered from the presence of such harms.
As with particularity as an evidentiary device, the factors
presented below do not map onto reasonable foreseeability in
every case, but they tend in this direction.
Third, the particularity inquiry speaks to courts’ explicit
insistence on limitations around the circle of potential plaintiffs,
as evidenced by the requirement that “the party seeking review
be himself among the injured.”222 In psychological harm cases,
courts are largely unwilling to cognize psychological harm when
the harm suffered by the plaintiffs is not “distinct from that
suffered by the public at large,”223 and the particularity factors
help to distinguish viable plaintiffs from the public at large.
Given these motivating principles, this section suggests
various factors that could be used in making the particularity
determination. The proposal is designed to be flexible, so that
courts could accept some factors without accepting others, and
220 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 202, § 54; cf. Barnes-Wallace v. City of San
Diego, 530 F.3d 776, 786 n.6 (9th Cir. 2008) (emphasizing that unlike in Barnes-
Wallace, “the problem with standing in Valley Forge was not the nature of the
psychological injury but ‘the absence of any personal injury at all’” (quoting Buono v.
Norton, 371 F.3d 543, 547 (9th Cir. 2004))).
221 See Kircher, supra note 155, at 815.
222 Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 735 (1972).
223 Fund for Animals, Inc. v. Lujan, 962 F.2d 1391, 1396 (9th Cir. 1992).
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add other factors as well. Further, the following factors are
meant to be illustrative rather than exhaustive. This flexibility
responds to the reality that there are many different types of
psychological harm, and courts should consequently be
adaptable in adjudicating claims of standing based on
psychological harm.
This section, in presenting factors to be used in the
particularity inquiry, draws on previous cases as examples of
the factors’ application. The section also extends the factors to
new sets of facts and offers correctives to previous cases.
a. Relationship to a Harmed Object
One factor that counts in favor of standing based on
psychological injury-in-fact is the relationship between the
plaintiff and another entity whose injuries give rise to
psychological harm. Psychological harm, as suggested by the
analysis above, often arises in the standing context when
plaintiffs assert harm to themselves as a consequence of harm to
a different object—an inanimate aspect of the environment,224 an
animal,225 or another human being unable to sue.226 Under the
proposed particularity analysis, a plaintiff would be more likely
to be able to assert standing successfully if he or she could
show a close relationship with the other object. This criterion is
inspired by, but not identical to, the requirement in many states
that plaintiffs bringing NIED claims when they are bystanders
to another person’s physical injury must share a close family
relationship with the physically injured.227 A plaintiff could
bolster claims of a close relationship through allegations (or
evidence, at the appropriate stage in the proceedings) of time
spent together, concern for the particular object’s fate, or history
of interest in that object.
An example of a case in which a court showed readiness
to delve into a plaintiff ’s relationship to a harmed object is the
D.C. Circuit case American Society for Prevention of Cruelty to
Animals v. Feld Entertainment.228 In the first iteration of this
224 E.g., Coal. for the Env’t v. Volpe, 504 F.2d 156, 167 (8th Cir. 1974).
225 E.g., Am. Soc’y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Ringling Bros.
and Barnum & Bailey Circus (APSCA I), 317 F.3d 334, 338 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
226 See, e.g., Chaudhry v. City of Los Angeles, 751 F.3d 1096, 1109 (9th Cir.
2014) (addressing allegations of emotional injury stemming from relationships with a
deceased individual).
227 See Cause of Action by Bystander for Negligent Infliction of Emotional
Distress, in 40 CAUSES OF ACTION 2D 115 § 8 (2009).
228 Am. Soc’y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Feld (APSCA II), 659
F.3d 13 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
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case, American Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v.
Ringling Bros., the D.C. Circuit, reversing the district court,
found that a former elephant handler had standing to sue the
owner of the circus where he worked for mistreating the
elephants in violation of the Endangered Species Act.229 The court
found injury-in-fact on the basis of the elephant handler’s
allegedly “strong, personal attachment to these animals”—an
attachment that meant, the elephant handler claimed, that he
would suffer “aesthetic and emotional injury” if he visited the
animals in their current state.230
Eight years later, after the case had been dismissed and
refiled, the D.C. Circuit upheld the district court’s finding,
following a bench trial, that the plaintiff did not show that he
actually had a personal attachment to the animals and was not
simply a “paid plaintiff,”231 and so the plaintiff had failed to
prove the allegations of injury-in-fact that had won him
standing at the pleading stage. Among the pieces of evidence
that the district court had considered were that the worker
“complained publicly about the elephants’ mistreatment only
after he was paid by activists to do so,” that he “had referred to
one of the elephants as a . . . ‘killer elephant’ who ‘hated’ him,”
“that he struggled to recall the names of the elephants in two
separate depositions,” “that he had failed to take advantage of
multiple opportunities to visit the elephants outside of the
circus,” and “that he was unable to identify the individual
elephants on videotape, including one who had the ‘distinctive
and unusual (for an Asian elephant) characteristic of a swayed
back.’”232
The D.C. Circuit in the later iteration of the case did not
revoke its earlier declaration that emotional harm generated
by personal attachment to animals could count as injury-in-
fact. But the D.C. Circuit held, in effect, that the particular
plaintiff had not established a sufficient nexus to the alleged
violation of the Endangered Species Act. The district court’s
consideration of various concrete factors affecting the relationship
between the circus worker and the elephant highlights the point
that the idea of “relationship” as a particularity factor need not be
an impenetrable black box; it can instead be a workable standard.
229 APSCA I, 317 F.3d at 338.
230 Id. at 335-37.
231 APSCA II, 659 F.3d at 18 (quoting Am. Soc. for Prevention of Cruelty to
Animals v. Feld Entm’t, Inc., 677 F. Supp. 2d 55, 67 (D.D.C. 2009)).
232 Id. at 20 (quoting Am. Soc. for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 677 F.
Supp. 2d at 84).
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b. Geographical Proximity
Geographical proximity to the source of the challenged
legal violation is another tool that courts can use to gauge the
nexus between the alleged violation and a particular plaintiff ’s
experience of psychological harm. For example, courts assessing
the constitutionality of religious displays can take into account
the extent of the plaintiff ’s actual exposure to the display.233
Courts dealing with environmental cases can emphasize whether
plaintiffs personally observed or interacted with the natural
phenomena they are suing in order to protect,234 and courts
addressing animal welfare claims can find injury-in-fact partly
on the basis that the plaintiffs personally witnessed the animal’s
suffering (even if there was no preexisting relationship between
the plaintiff and the animal).235
The geographical proximity criterion draws on elements
of NIED claims in jurisdictions in which plaintiffs must have a
“sensory and contemporaneous observance” of the accident in
order to recover when they suffer emotional distress as a result
of witnessing an accident as bystanders.236 Although there is no
reason to believe that only plaintiffs in geographical proximity
to the challenged practice would experience psychological harm,
there seems to be some truth to the notion, reflected in this
NIED doctrine, that proximity to conduct that is repugnant or
otherwise distressing to a person would be especially likely to
provoke mental or emotional suffering.237 “Out of sight, out of
mind” does not hold true across the board, but the fact that
people frequently avoid direct contact with situations they find
psychologically or emotionally distressing speaks to the influence
that geographical proximity can have.
233 See, e.g., Red River Freethinkers v. City of Fargo, 679 F.3d 1015, 1024 (8th
Cir. 2012); ACLU of Ohio Found., Inc. v. DeWeese, 633 F.3d 424, 429 (6th Cir. 2011).
234 See, e.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc.,
528 U.S. 167, 181-82 (2000).
235 See, e.g., Fund for Animals, Inc. v. Lujan, 962 F.2d 1391, 1396-97 (9th Cir.
1992); Hill v. Coggins, No. 13-cv-00047, 2014 WL 2738664, at *4 (W.D.N.C. June 17,
2014); Levine v. Johanns, Nos. 05-cv-04764, 05-cv-05346, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63667,
at *32-33 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 2006), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Levine v. Vilsack,
587 F.3d 986 (9th Cir. 2009). In Levine, a California district court held that workers at
a poultry plant had suffered cognizable emotional injury from “directly witnessing the
suffering of animals.” Levine, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63667, at *32. The Ninth Circuit
reversed on redressability grounds and noted on appeal that the Department of
Agriculture had challenged only the district court’s redressability ruling. See Levine,
587 F.3d at 992, 997.
236 40 CAUSES OF ACTION 2D 115, supra note 227, § 11.
237 See, e.g., Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 920 (Cal. 1968) (including, among
the factors used to evaluate NIED claims, “[w]hether plaintiff was located near the
scene of the accident as contrasted with one who was a distance away from it”).
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It was therefore plausible for the Ninth Circuit to conclude
in Barnes-Wallace v. City of San Diego that lesbian and agnostic
plaintiffs showed “personal emotional harm” resulting from the
Boy Scouts’ lease of recreational land in the city.238 In this case,
the plaintiffs stated that they wished to use this land but did
not do so, on account of their opposition to the Boy Scouts’
positions on homosexuality and religion.239 It was similarly
appropriate for the Ninth Circuit in Catholic League to draw on
proximity-related factors to conclude that Catholic citizens of
San Francisco had standing to challenge a city resolution that
condemned the Church’s positions on adoption by same-sex
couples.240 The court noted that plaintiffs had pleaded, among
other factors, that “(1) they live in San Francisco”; “(2) they are
Catholics”; and “(3) they have come in contact with the
resolution.”241 The court, in one of the most detailed discussions
of psychological harm in a judicial opinion, used such proximity-
related factors in distinguishing between different types of
psychological harm: “[a] ‘psychological consequence’ does not
suffice as concrete harm where it is produced merely by
‘observation of conduct with which one disagrees.’ But it does
constitute concrete harm where the ‘psychological consequence’ is
produced by government condemnation of one’s own religion or
endorsement of another’s in one’s own community.”242 The point
that the alleged legal violation occurred in the plaintiffs’ “own
community” therefore helped, in this case, to constitute the
nature of the psychological harm itself—as a response to
government condemnation of a kind that was thought to damage
the relationship between the individual and the community.
The proximity criterion would also have provided a
more effective way for the Supreme Court to address the claim
of stigmatic injury in Allen v. Wright. As Justice Brennan’s
dissent in that case pointed out, the plaintiffs’ claims could be
interpreted not as alleging that all African-Americans suffered
stigmatic injury as a consequence of government policies on tax
exemptions for racially discriminatory private schools, but
rather that “black children attending public schools in districts
238 Barnes-Wallace v. City of San Diego, 530 F.3d 776, 784 (9th Cir. 2008).
239 Id.
240 Catholic League for Religious & Civil Rights v. City & County of San
Francisco, 624 F.3d 1043, 1053 (9th Cir. 2010).
241 Id. The court also indicated that the plaintiffs had alleged that the
resolution “convey[ed] a government message of disapproval and hostility toward their
religious beliefs” and sent a “clear message . . . that they are outsiders, not full
members of the political community,” thereby “chilling their access to the government”
and “forcing them to curtail their political activities.” Id.
242 Id. at 1052.
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that are currently desegregating yet contain discriminatory
private schools benefiting from illegal tax exemptions” have
suffered a stigmatic injury.243 The Court could therefore have
limited a claim of stigmatic injury (or psychological harm) to
those plaintiffs in geographical proximity to the alleged legal
violation and, in this way, avoided both the rejection of stigmatic
injury and the open-ended expansion of standing.244
c. Longevity and Frequency
As part of the particularity inquiry, courts could take
into account time-related factors, such as the longevity of the
plaintiff ’s connection to the situation from which the harm
arises and the frequency of the plaintiff ’s contact with the
situation. For example, a student alleging illegal treatment by
a public school teacher could bolster a claim of psychological
injury-in-fact by showing that he had been subject to the hostile
conduct frequently or for a long period of time.245 By contrast, a
person who had spent only a weekend vacationing at a place of
great natural beauty would have less of a claim of injury-in-fact
based on psychological harm if the place were slated to be
destroyed. Like the “relationship” and “geographical proximity”
factors, the time-related factors play an evidentiary role in
suggesting that plaintiffs have suffered psychological harm; it is
easier to conclude that such an allegation is plausible when
plaintiffs can show that they have encountered the challenged
conduct several times or over an extended period of time.
d. Severity
A court could also treat the severity of the mental or
emotional suffering as an aspect of the case favoring a finding
of injury-in-fact.246 There are valid questions about the legitimacy
243 Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 770 n.3 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
244 See Healy, supra note 36, at 430, 465-66.
245 Cf. Estate of Morris ex rel. Morris v. Dapolito, 297 F. Supp. 2d 680, 690
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (finding injury-in-fact when a public school student suffered “public
humiliation, public shame, public degradation, anxiety, public embarrassment, . . .
emotional upset, loss of self-esteem, and was otherwise rendered sick and sore” (alteration
in original) (quoting Amended Complaint ¶ 56)).
246 A similar approach is taken in Brooklyn Center for Independence of the
Disabled, where a court found standing partly “based on the threat of future harm and
the fear and apprehension caused by it” and noted that “where the threatened injury is
particularly severe, courts are more likely to find standing.” Brooklyn Ctr. for Indep. of
the Disabled v. Bloomberg, 290 F.R.D. 409, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (citing Baur v. Veneman,
352 F.3d 625, 637 (2d Cir. 2003) (“Because the evaluation of risk is qualitative, the
probability of harm which a plaintiff must demonstrate in order to allege a cognizable
injury-in-fact logically varies with the severity of the probable harm.”).
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of using severity as part of the particularity inquiry. Ordinarily,
courts do not inquire into the gravity of an injury before finding
that it counts as injury-in-fact.247 If a person loses five dollars, he or
she is eligible to claim injury-in-fact; if the person is only slightly
psychologically harmed, should he or she be less able to sue?
But it is not necessarily problematic to maintain different
standards for injury-in-fact when it comes to psychological harm.
One of the problems with standing doctrine may be that courts
have insisted on using a single framework to govern all types of
standing claims instead of engaging in a more contextually
sensitive inquiry. Given reluctance to cognize psychological harm
as compared to other types of harm, evidentiary issues about
proving psychological harm, and the difficulty of distinguishing
between cognizable harm and “generalized grievances” that
provoke mental or emotional reactions in citizens, it is reasonable
for courts to use severity as one factor in evaluating the question
of whether a particular plaintiff bringing suit has suffered Article
III injury. One could make an analogy to tort law, where IIED
claims include “[s]evere emotional distress” as an element, even
though other intentional torts do not include severe damage as an
element of liability.248
Severity could also plausibly be seen not as a means of
assessing whether a particular plaintiff has been sufficiently
psychologically harmed, but as a means of assessing whether a
particular plaintiff has been psychologically harmed at all. In
fact, plaintiffs bringing claims of psychological harm frequently
assert severe mental or emotional distress.249 One reason may
be to improve a damages award or to bring a claim that has
severe distress as an element (notably IIED), but allegations of
severity appear even when no such claims are at issue and
plaintiffs do not seek damages.250 The thought might well be that
alleging severe psychological harm will make it more likely for
the relevant harm to be acknowledged as real. It is difficult for
courts to assess a claim that, say, a plaintiff experienced mild,
passing annoyance—more difficult than assessing a claim that
a plaintiff ’s bank account lost one dollar. In light of this
247 See Sprint Commc’ns Co., L.P. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 554 U.S. 269, 289
(2008); United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP),
412 U.S. 669, 680 n.144 (1973); see also Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S.
83, 127 (1998) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
248 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. j (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
249 See, e.g., Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614, 618 (2004); Humane Soc’y of the U.S.
v. Babbitt, 46 F.3d 93, 98 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Estate of Morris ex rel. Morris v. Dapolito,
297 F. Supp. 2d 680, 690 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); see also Clayton v. White Hall Sch. Dist., 875
F.2d 676, 679 (8th Cir. 1989).
250 See, e.g., Babbitt, 46 F.3d at 98.
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distinction, it is reasonable for courts to take severity into account
in the particularity analysis. Of course, severity is only one factor
in this analysis, so light psychological harm could sometimes
suffice as injury-in-fact if other factors are present.
e. Plaintiff ’s History
The proposed approach to psychological harm and
standing is flexible, and it could accommodate factors that would
more aggressively stretch the bounds of courts’ current Article III
jurisprudence. In particular, a factor that courts could but need
not take into account is the history of a plaintiff ’s attachment to a
cause that would be set back by the alleged legal violation.
Political and social activists may feel very strongly about causes
such as the environment, firearm regulation, the relationship
between religion and politics, abortion, animal welfare, and so on.
Even courts that have rejected standing based on psychological
harm that seems to stem simply from political disagreement have
acknowledged the depth of some such plaintiffs’ feelings.251
Indeed, as discussed above, these plaintiffs may be especially
motivated to present vigorous legal advocacy on behalf of
their cause.252
Furthermore, courts are not incapable of adjudicating
people’s degree of attachment to a cause. For example, in United
States v. Seeger, the Supreme Court found that for the purposes of
conscientious objector exemptions, “the test of belief ‘in a relation
to a Supreme Being’ is whether a given belief that is sincere
and meaningful occupies a place in the life of its possessor
parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God of one who
clearly qualifies for the exemption.”253 A court could similarly
find that attachment to the environment, the separation of
church and state, data privacy, or other beliefs and principles
constitutes a crucial aspect of particular plaintiffs’ lives in such
a way that these plaintiffs are likely to be psychologically
harmed when the object of this attachment is in jeopardy.
Recognizing plaintiffs’ historical attachments as a
particularity factor would run counter to the courts’ current
standing jurisprudence, which is generally highly skeptical of
“ideological” plaintiffs.254 One approach would be for courts to
251 See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of
Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 486 (1982).
252 See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
253 United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 165-66 (1965).
254 E.g., Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 485-86; United States v. 5 S 351 Tuthill
Road, Naperville, Ill., 233 F.3d 1017, 1022 (7th Cir. 2000).
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allow historical attachment to weigh in favor of finding injury-
in-fact only when other particularity factors have been
satisfied. But even if courts are inclined to reject plaintiffs’
history as a particularity factor, this factor is not a necessary
part of the proposal advanced here. The concept serves simply
to show that the test may be adjusted to include a variety of
factors depending on how expansively a court is willing to
interpret injury-in-fact requirements.
In light of this enumeration of different factors, how do
they all fit together? Take a hypothetical case (inspired by the
facts of the Ninth Circuit case Fund for Animals v. Lujan)255 in
which members of an animal-welfare organization sue the
government and claim injury-in-fact because on one occasion,
they personally saw an animal being brutally killed as a result
of an alleged legal violation. The relationship factor would not
speak strongly in favor of standing, since none of the members
had any preexisting relationship to the animal. However, the
proximity factor would weigh heavily in favor of a finding of
injury-in-fact, because the members were directly in front of
the animal when it was killed. The longevity and frequency
factors would likely not weigh in favor of standing, given the
singular nature of the encounter. But in light of the encounter’s
intensity, the severity factor would pull the court in the
direction of finding injury-in-fact. The plaintiffs’ history, if the
court were willing to include this factor, would also encourage a
finding of injury-in-fact.
As with many multifactor legal tests, there is no
mathematical formula to determine the result of combining
these considerations. Overall, the severity criterion would
likely make the difference in this hypothetical case, and
accordingly, a court is likely to find injury-in-fact. Beyond this
specific example, the essential point is that whatever way a
court comes out, it should clearly explain the basis for its
decision in accordance with the same framework that it would
apply more generally. In the actual Fund for Animals v. Lujan
case, the court found standing based on the “psychological
injury [the plaintiff organization’s members] suffered from
viewing the killing of the bison in Montana,” noting that the
members “suffered an injury arising from a ‘direct sensory
impact of a change in [their] physical environment.’”256 The
court was correct to consider this proximity factor and to place
255 Fund for Animals, Inc. v. Lujan, 962 F.2d 1391 (9th Cir. 1992).
256 Id. at 1396-97 (alteration in original) (quoting Animal Lovers Volunteer
Ass’n v. Weinberger, 765 F.2d 937, 938 (9th Cir. 1985)).
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it on the scales in a way that favored a finding of injury-in-fact.
Nevertheless, to the extent that the members had only a brief,
one-time contact with the bison, the court should also have taken
into account the longevity and frequency prongs. The court might
still justifiably have come out the same way, but it would have
done so with an explicit acknowledgment that multiple factors
can appropriately guide an analysis of psychological harm as
injury-in-fact.
To round out the discussion of particularity factors, this
section turns to the psychological reactions of fear or anxiety
about future events. As noted above, there exists a
“bootstrapping” concern that if courts cognize fear or anxiety that
fails to meet the Clapper standard for injury-in-fact—of “certainly
impending” injury or at least a “substantial risk” of injury—then
the Clapper standard could be undermined by the recognition of
psychological injury-in-fact. There are several possible ways of
dealing with this issue.
One is simply to remove future events from the ambit of
the test for psychological standing, so that if psychological
harm results from an anticipated event, then it is not cognizable.
The Supreme Court case Lyons gestured in this direction
(though, as noted above, the Court in Lyons did not institute
such a categorical bar). In Lyons, the Court stated, in
evaluating a claim brought by a plaintiff who feared being
placed in a chokehold by the Los Angeles police, that “it is the
reality of the threat of repeated injury that is relevant to the
standing inquiry, not the plaintiff ’s subjective apprehensions.”257
More recently, in 2013, a D.C. district court held in a case called
Bernstein v. Kerry that American citizens living in Israel, one of
whose asserted bases for standing was that, as a result of
terrorism, “they live in constant fear that their lives and
livelihood are at risk,” did not sufficiently allege injury-in-fact.258
The court, citing Clapper, ruled that the injury the plaintiffs
asserted was too “speculative” to support standing and that
“plaintiffs have no legal support for the view that a subjective
emotional response to the possibility of an invasion of a legally-
protected interest constitutes an injury-in-fact.”259 Yet neither
Lyons nor Bernstein explained precisely what makes certain
257 City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 107 n.8 (1983).
258 Bernstein v. Kerry, 962 F. Supp. 2d 122, 127 (D.D.C. 2013); see also Tomsha
v. Gen. Servs. Admin., No. 15-cv-7326, 2016 WL 3538380, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 21, 2016)
(“Plaintiffs’ genuine fears of a future terrorist attack at One World Trade Center are
insufficient to establish constitutional standing.”); George v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 63
F. App’x 917, 918 (7th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he inmates’ ‘injury’ amounts to nothing more than a
generalized fear of terrorism that is shared by many if not most Americans.”).
259 Bernstein, 962 F. Supp. 2d at 127.
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apprehensions “subjective” or squarely addressed the issue of
whether anxiety or fear should count as injury-in-fact when the
feared harm is not considered overly “speculative.”
The rejection of all anxiety or fear as injury-in-fact would
draw too uncompromising a line between various types of
psychological harm. Plaintiffs’ concern about future legal
violations can wreak as much psychological havoc as their
psychological responses to currently occurring legal violations,
and labeling the former type of harm per se not cognizable
would be arbitrary. Moreover, prevailing standards for injury-
in-fact—including those enumerated in Clapper—leave open
the possibility of accepting events short of currently occurring
injury as injury-in-fact, provided a certain “imminence”
requirement is met.260 There is no logical inconsistency between
accepting events short of currently occurring injury as injury-in-
fact on the one hand, and rejecting fear and anxiety about future
events as bases for standing on the other.261 But cognizing future
events strengthens the grounds for cognizing fear and anxiety
concerning those events. After all, part of the reason why future
events are harmful is their effect on plaintiffs in the present,
including their effects on plaintiffs’ psychological states. It might
be contended that the future “risk” of harm is injurious in itself.
But when one delves into the precise nature of the concern with
the future, present costs, including psychological ones, seem to be
significant aspects of the concern.
Instead of rejecting all anxiety or fear as injury-in-fact,
courts should, at a minimum, indicate that anxiety or fear
about future events counts as psychological injury-in-fact when
the anticipated event meets the “certainly impending” (or
“substantial risk”262) standard. This approach would preserve
both adherence to Clapper and a role for anxiety and fear about
future events as injury-in-fact. Courts could also go further and
abandon the Clapper standard, instead holding that a
“reasonable fear” suffices for standing, as the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals in Clapper had done.263 This move would still
allow courts to rule out unreasonable or overly “speculative”
260 See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1143, 1151 (2013); Lujan
v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). While Clapper rejected the proposition that
present costs incurred on the basis of any reasonable fear would suffice for injury-in-fact,
Clapper did not prevent future events per se from constituting injury-in-fact, provided
that the projected event was “certainly impending.” See Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1151.
261 See Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1151.
262 See Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2341 (2014).
263 Amnesty Int’l USA v. Clapper, 638 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 2011), rev’d, 133
S. Ct. 1138 (2013).
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fears.264 Such an approach would be more in line with the general
proposal about psychological injury-in-fact that this article
supports, as it would enable courts to cognize the particular
psychological responses of anxiety or fear when there is a
sufficiently close nexus between the alleged legal violation and a
specific plaintiff. But abandoning the Clapper standard is not a
necessary implication of this proposal. Overall, then, the Supreme
Court’s current jurisprudence can accommodate an approach
that recognizes as injury-in-fact the psychological harm
associated with fear and anxiety about future events, but this
article’s proposal also raises issues that would prompt a
rethinking of the Clapper standard.
B. Psychological Harm and Injury-in-Fact: Further
Development
This section further develops the article’s proposal
through a consideration of additional features of the topic of
psychological harm and injury-in-fact, including objections to
the points made in this article thus far. In particular, this section
considers (1) the relationship between restrictions on psychological
injury-in-fact and other threshold matters governing plaintiffs’
access to the federal courts, (2) whether psychological harm, on this
article’s proposal, becomes superfluous because the actual injury is
simply the violation of a protected legal interest, and (3) whether
this article’s proposal unduly expands judicial discretion by giving
courts too much latitude in determining when psychological harm
counts as injury-in-fact.
1. The Proposed Limitations on Psychological Injury-in-
Fact and Other Threshold Matters
The question may arise how the article’s proposed
limitations on psychological harm as injury-in-fact interact
with other limitations on Article III standing, such as the
causation and redressability prongs of the Article III standing
test, or, more broadly, with other threshold matters governing
plaintiffs’ access to the courts, such as the requirement that a
plaintiff assert a valid cause of action. This article posits that
there are reasons to decide issues of psychological harm–based
264 See also Baur v. Veneman, 352 F.3d 625, 628 & n.11 (2d Cir. 2003)
(determining that a plaintiff had standing to sue the U.S. Department of Agriculture to
stop certain Department practices based on the plaintiff ’s “exposure to an enhanced
risk of disease transmission,” and stating that “post-filing events may confirm that a
plaintiff’s fear of future harm is reasonable”).
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standing through a focus specifically on injury-in-fact. For
instance, there is value in validating psychological harm as a
genuine injury, and engagement with psychological harm and
its limitations as part of the injury-in-fact inquiry can further
this aim. At the same time, there is certainly overlap between
various doctrines that play a role in determining plaintiffs’
access to the federal courts. In fact, if one prefers to see a part
of the article’s proposal as better handled under another
jurisdiction-related or justiciability doctrine, then that option
may be left open. It may be less useful to draw bright lines
between different aspects of standing doctrine than to consider
whether a given approach to psychological harm as injury-in-
fact serves the purposes of the standing inquiry, including the
clear and adverse presentation of factual issues and the
presence of a limiting principle.
For example, one issue is the relationship between the
“legally protected interest” prong and the question of whether a
plaintiff has a cause of action.265 While the two issues could be
treated separately, existing doctrine suggests that whether a
legally protected interest has been violated is part of the
injury-in-fact inquiry.266 Consequently, the violation of such an
interest can both provide a cause of action and constitute part
of the test that permits a plaintiff to assert injury-in-fact
successfully. In this sense, courts considering whether a plaintiff
has a cause of action are simultaneously conducting one aspect,
though not the only aspect, of the injury-in-fact inquiry. Such
an outcome is compatible with the courts’ view of standing
doctrine as a requirement to be satisfied over and above the
presence of a cause of action.267 This is not to rule out the
possibility that courts could review the “legally protected
interest” issue through a cause of action analysis, treat
psychological harm as injury-in-fact if it satisfies the particularity
condition, and then put together these inquiries (and others) to
265 See Fletcher, supra note 17, at 232-33, 290-91; Sunstein, supra note 17, at 166.
266 See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (“[T]he plaintiff
must have suffered an ‘injury in fact’—an invasion of a legally protected interest which
is (a) concrete and particularized, . . . and (b) ‘actual or imminent, not “conjectural” or
“hypothetical”’” (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990))); see also
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 756 (1984) (noting that “children’s diminished ability to
receive an education in a racially integrated school[ ] is[ ] . . . not only judicially
cognizable but . . . one of the most serious injuries recognized in our legal system”
(citing Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Bob Jones Univ. v.
United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983))).
267 See Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp (ADAPSO), 397 U.S.
150, 154 (1970). For critiques of the requirement of injury-in-fact over and above the
presence of a cause of action, see Fletcher, supra note 17, at 232-33, and Sunstein, supra
note 17, at 166-67.
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determine whether a plaintiff can bring a claim. But treating
the “legally protected interest” prong as part of the inquiry into
psychological harm’s cognizability helps to address concerns
that recognizing psychological harm would inject too much
subjectivity into standing analysis, since the psychological
harm would need to be connected to the violation of a genuine
legal interest.268
Limitations on psychological injury-in-fact also intersect
with other inquiries in constitutional standing doctrine, namely
causation and redressability. For example, the particularity
analysis might be seen as a way to ask whether the alleged legal
violation actually caused the psychological harm. Looking into
the nexus between a plaintiff and an alleged legal violation,
that is, seems like an inquiry into the causal link between the
two. It may be questioned, therefore, why the article’s proposal
treats the particularity inquiry as part of injury-in-fact rather
than part of causation or redressability. In response, this article
follows existing jurisprudence in considering factors related to
the particularity inquiry—for example, personal observation of
animal slaughter,269 “direct and unwelcome” contact with a
challenged religious display,270 or personal use of a river271—as
part of an examination of injury-in-fact rather than of causation.
In arguing for a more explicit, thorough, and widespread
application of particularity factors, this article aims to build on
principles that some courts have already adopted.
Moreover, and moving past the interest in speaking to
existing doctrine, the particularity condition is primarily designed
268 Another question is how the “legally protected interest” prong relates to
the “zone of interests” test. The “zone of interests” inquiry involves asking whether the
interest that the plaintiff seeks to protect is “arguably within the zone of interests to be
protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question.”
ADAPSO, 397 U.S. at 153. In the past, the “zone of interests” test was viewed as a
“prudential” standing doctrine. See, e.g., Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542
U.S. 1, 12 (2004). Recently, however, the Supreme Court rejected the classification of
the “zone of interests” test as a prudential standing doctrine and indicated that (at
least in statutory cases) “[w]hether a plaintiff comes within ‘the “zone of interests”’ is
an issue that requires us to determine, using traditional tools of statutory
interpretation, whether a legislatively conferred cause of action encompasses a
particular plaintiff’s claim.” Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134
S. Ct. 1377, 1387 (2014). To the extent that the “zone of interests” test is now more
akin to the issue of whether a particular plaintiff has a cause of action, the comments
above on the relationship between the “legally protected interest” prong and the issue
of whether the plaintiff has a cause of action would apply.
269 See Levine v. Johanns, Nos. 05-cv-04764, 05-cv-05346, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 63667, at *32-33 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 2006), rev’d on other grounds sub nom.
Levine v. Vilsack, 587 F.3d 986 (9th Cir. 2009).
270 ACLU of Ohio Found., Inc. v. DeWeese, 633 F.3d 424, 429 (6th Cir. 2011).
271 See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528
U.S. 167, 182 (2000).
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to track not the origins of psychological harm, but the
reasonability of supposing that psychological harm is present in a
particular plaintiff at all. Once a court accepts that psychological
harm is present in a particular plaintiff, the causation issue still
remains as a separate inquiry. For instance, a court could find
that the defendant’s actions were not truly responsible for the
leak of the plaintiff ’s personal information that gave rise to
psychological harm, because the leak was “fairly traceable” only to
an intervening party. The causation inquiry, in this example, is
more about the appropriateness of the defendant than of the
plaintiff. Did the psychologically harmed plaintiff sue the right
individual or entity? This question remains after the issue of
whether a particular plaintiff has the requisite connection to the
alleged legal violation is addressed. Consequently, the particularity
inquiry is not equivalent to causation analysis, even if particularity
factors play a role in both. Rather, the particularity inquiry
distinctly speaks to the suitability of specific plaintiffs to raise
claims of psychological harm.
Another aspect of constitutional standing is redressability—
whether it is “‘likely,’ as opposed to merely ‘speculative,’ that the
injury will be ‘redressed by a favorable decision’”272—and one
might argue that the “legally protected interest” test is actually
a proxy for redressability. That is, in asking whether a plaintiff ’s
psychological harm stems from the alleged violation of a legally
protected interest, a court might effectively be asking whether
enforcing or changing the law would redress the harm. In
response, a concern about redressability may well broadly underlie
courts’ approaches to issues of standing and justiciability. If a
plaintiff sues claiming that she has suffered psychological harm as
a consequence of light mockery, a court may be concerned that it
cannot rectify the situation and so may not wish to exercise
jurisdiction. But even if redressability plays an underlying or
motivating role in the “legally protected interest” inquiry, the
latter inquiry is still conceptually distinct. A plaintiff can suffer
psychological harm as a result of an alleged legal violation even
if the likelihood of redressability is absent—for example, because
a ruling against a particular defendant would not change the
behavior of third parties not before the court.273
Overall, federal courts have created a web of legal
doctrines governing plaintiffs’ capacity to bring a claim. While
the injury-in-fact requirement can do some work in terms of
272 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426
U.S. 26, 38 (1976)).
273 See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562 (1992).
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limiting standing claims, it need not do all of it. In fact, this point
can help to alleviate concerns that recognizing psychological
injury-in-fact will eviscerate limitations on the federal courts’
jurisdiction. Even if plaintiffs show injury-in-fact as a result of
psychological harm, they must still assert a cause of action,
show causation and redressability, and fulfill the standards of
justiciability doctrines such as mootness and ripeness.274 Of course,
in order to be ultimately successful, plaintiffs must also present
valid legal claims on the merits. These points weigh against the
concern that recognizing psychological injury-in-fact would license
an undue expansion in the federal courts’ jurisdiction.
2. Whether Psychological Harm Is Rendered
Superfluous
According to this article’s proposal for evaluating
whether psychological harm is cognizable, the harm must
respond to the alleged violation of a legally protected interest,
and the harmed plaintiff must have a particular connection to
that violation. It may be argued that once these conditions are
satisfied, there is no longer any need for courts to cognize
psychological harm, for under this article’s proposal, it is the
alleged violation of the legally protected interest, and not the
resulting psychological harm, that gives rise to standing. In
response, this objection would also undercut the cognizability of
economic injury-in-fact if monetary harm results from the
alleged invasion of a legally protected interest. In other words,
if the alleged violation of a protected legal interest leads to
economic loss, then why should the economic loss count as
injury-in-fact? Yet courts have shown little appetite for
questioning economic loss as injury-in-fact. It is coherent to say
both (1) that psychological harm counts as injury-in-fact and (2)
that psychological harm counts as injury-in-fact only when
certain conditions are fulfilled, namely that the harm constitutes
a response to the alleged violation of a legally protected interest
and that the plaintiff has a sufficiently close relationship to the
violation.
In fact, the possibility of holding both positions suggests
that this article’s proposal need not contradict the
pronouncements of some courts that seem to reject psychological
injury-in-fact altogether. Such courts frequently characterize
the harm at issue using words like “mere psychological
274 For a discussion of ripeness doctrine, see supra note 109.
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discomfort”275 or “purely psychological harm.”276 If all these
statements mean—and this is certainly debatable—is that a
psychological reaction conceived independently of any cognitive
response to an outside influence cannot count for standing, then
they are not incompatible with the article’s proposal, which
requires plaintiffs to claim that their psychological harm is
responsive to the alleged violation of a legally protected interest
and to satisfy the particularity condition.277
The concern that psychological harm “drops out” could
also be raised with respect to fear or anxiety about future
events. If courts cognize fear or anxiety only when the future
event is “certainly impending”—or even when the fear of a
future event is “reasonable”—then are they not just cognizing
the future event as injury-in-fact, independent of plaintiffs’
fear? To some degree, courts simply have a choice about how to
conceptualize the injury. Yet they could plausibly conceptualize
the fear as injury-in-fact on the condition that the fear meets
certain standards, among which is that it responds to a
certainly impending event. This kind of conceptualization
would have the advantage of clearly communicating courts’
recognition of the genuine and significant impact of
psychological harm on citizens. The article’s proposal, therefore,
does not render psychological harm superfluous.
3. Particularity and Judicial Discretion
Perhaps most fundamentally, the particularity inquiry
might be challenged as an arbitrary standard that illegitimately
enhances judicial discretion and leads to an open-ended
expansion of standing. In particular, one could contend that the
275 Freedom From Religion Found., Inc. v. Zielke, 845 F.2d 1463, 1468 n.3 (7th
Cir. 1988).
276 United States v. All Funds on Deposit with R.J. O’Brien & Assocs., 783
F.3d 607, 616 (7th Cir. 2015); see also Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 551
U.S. 587, 619-20 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring) (referring to the “conceptualizing of
injury in fact in purely mental terms”).
277 These courts’ conception of psychological states would then be in line with
what Dan Kahan and Martha Nussbaum label a “mechanistic” conception of emotion,
which “sees emotions as forces that do not contain or respond to thought.” Kahan &
Nussbaum, supra note 35, at 273. Kahan and Nussbaum distinguish this conception
from an “evaluative conception” of emotion, according to which “emotions express
cognitive appraisals” and “these appraisals can themselves be morally evaluated.” Id.
at 273. If psychological states are understood mechanistically, then this article may be
interpreted as proposing that particular psychological states suffice for injury-in-fact
when they respond to the alleged violation of a legally protected interest and the
particularity condition is met. If psychological states are understood evaluatively, on
the other hand, then responsiveness to the alleged violation of a legally protected
interest might itself be viewed as part of the psychological state in question.
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particularity analysis does not consistently track factors that
ought to be relevant to plaintiffs’ ability to claim psychological
injury-in-fact. For example, a plaintiff with little connection to
a particular forest, but a very strong interest in environmental
protection, might be more likely to be kept out of court even
under this article’s proposal than a casual member of an
environmental organization who alleges that she walks through
the forest every so often.
In response, the particularity factors should be evaluated
as a whole rather than individually. The analysis in this article
leaves open the possibility that courts could consider a plaintiff ’s
historical involvement with a cause. But even beyond the
potential inclusion of this factor, other aspects of the
particularity inquiry, such as the low frequency of the casual
member’s contact with the forest (in the example just given),
might lower the likelihood that the casual member would have
standing. More generally, seemingly arbitrary results might
actually turn out to be less arbitrary once the entire
particularity analysis is considered.
Furthermore, the particularity inquiry necessarily paints
in broad strokes, and it is not alone among legal tests in doing
this. Nothing guarantees that psychological harm will more likely
be present—or be present in the form that courts ought to
acknowledge for Article III purposes—when a plaintiff personally
has a disturbing experience, for a prolonged period of time or at
frequent intervals, or when a plaintiff has a close relationship
with a harmed object. Similarly, in NIED claims, nothing
guarantees that plaintiffs are more likely to suffer emotional
distress as a result of negligent conduct when they are within
the “zone of danger” created by the defendant’s conduct or when
they have a close relationship with an individual who is
physically harmed by the defendant’s negligence. Of course,
NIED doctrines have also been criticized for arbitrariness.278
But both types of inquiries justifiably involve the use of proxies
that can be useful even if they do not always hit the target.
Moreover, the proposed particularity factors are not binary
(either applicable or not applicable) in the way some NIED
elements are. Courts can determine that plaintiffs are more or
less proximate, closer or further in relationship, and so on. In this
way, they can adjust the particularity test in response to the facts
of the specific situation. This approach can help to reduce, if not
eliminate, the potential for arbitrariness in decisionmaking.
278 See Rhee, supra note 201, at 845-47.
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This article’s proposal, and especially the particularity
inquiry’s weighing of various factors, undeniably requires the
exercise of judicial discretion. But the proposal must be judged
in relation to the existing treatment of psychological harm in
standing doctrine.279 Currently, the distinction between “the
psychological consequence presumably produced by observation
of conduct with which one disagrees”280 and “psychological
injury in fact sufficient to confer standing”281 is highly cryptic,
and courts have provided little explicit guidance as to when
mental or emotional reactions fall into each category.282
Moreover, courts’ assessments of injury-in-fact often involve
the use of fairly ambiguous terms such as “concrete,” “abstract,”
“particularized,” “generalized,” “diffuse,” and “imminent.” Against
this background, the proposal advanced here offers an explicit
and broadly applicable framework to govern the conditions
under which the cognizability of psychological harm can be
evaluated. The proposal requires courts to be clear about the
nature of the types of harm they are cognizing as injury-in-fact,
so that other parties can engage directly with the reasons for
courts’ decisions. It would be unrealistic and even undesirable to
expect a standing test to eliminate all forms of judicial discretion.
To the extent that standing doctrine presents recurring problems
about arbitrariness, however, this article’s proposal represents a
corrective to the existing doctrine.
Consequently, this article’s proposal should not be
understood to license an open-ended expansion of standing—
which is often an issue when psychological harm is being
considered as a type of injury-in-fact. In addition to the fact
that the proposal expressly provides limitations on
psychological harm, as described above, injury-in-fact is, more
broadly, only one potential restriction on plaintiffs’ ability to
bring suit. Also present, as mentioned earlier, are the other
prongs of Article III standing (causation and redressability),
the requirement that plaintiffs assert a cause of action, and
justiciability doctrines such as ripeness, mootness, and political
questions. Courts can explicitly recognize psychological harm
279 Cf. Kahan, supra note 56, at 645 (urging that shaming penalties be
assessed in comparison to relevant alternatives, notably imprisonment).
280 Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church &
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 485 (1982).
281 ACLU of Ohio Found., Inc. v. DeWeese, 633 F.3d 424, 429 (6th Cir. 2011).
282 Cf. Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1121 (10th Cir. 2012). For one of the
most developed discussions of the distinction between cognizable and noncognizable
“psychological consequence,” see Catholic League for Religious and Civil Rights v. City
and County of San Francisco, 624 F.3d 1043, 1052 (9th Cir. 2010).
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as injury-in-fact without undermining the notion that the
federal courts possess limited jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
This article has argued that federal courts ought to
recognize psychological harm as injury-in-fact explicitly and adopt
a clear framework to govern limitations on its cognizability. It has
provided an account of the current treatment of psychological
harm in constitutional standing doctrine and recommended
mechanisms for a more effective approach to this topic—in
particular, an inquiry into whether the psychological harm
responds to the alleged violation of a legally protected interest
and stands in a particular connection to that violation. The
latter inquiry, in turn, ought to consider such factors as the
relationship between the plaintiff and another entity whose
injury gives rise to the plaintiff ’s psychological harm, the
plaintiff ’s geographical proximity to the source of the challenged
legal violation, the longevity of the plaintiff ’s connection to the
situation from which the harm arises, the frequency of the
plaintiff ’s contact with the situation, the severity of the plaintiff ’s
mental or emotional suffering, and, potentially, the history of a
plaintiff ’s attachment to a cause that would be impaired by the
alleged legal violation. The bottom line is that when plaintiffs
claim that they have been hurt psychologically or emotionally,
federal courts, far from closing their doors, should wade into the
thicket of distinguishing cognizable psychological harms from
noncognizable ones. Doing so will enable the federal courts to
acknowledge more fully citizens’ genuine experiences of harm
without abandoning the restrictions on jurisdiction that Article
III standing doctrine reflects.
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APPENDIX
This Appendix provides a database of several cases in
which federal courts have dealt with the topic of psychological
harm and related intangible injuries as injury-in-fact. The
Appendix is designed to provide a sample, though not an
exhaustive list, of such cases in order to illuminate judicial
responses to the issue of psychological harm and standing.
Though several distinct injuries may be alleged in any given
case, the Appendix identifies those injuries most relevant to
psychological harm. The Appendix is organized by judicial
circuit (with Supreme Court cases first); within each circuit,
appeals court cases precede district court cases, and within the
categories of appeals court cases and district court cases, cases
are organized chronologically.
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Federal Circuit
Citation Alleged Injury Injury-in-Fact? Further Notes
Madstad Eng’g,
Inc. v. U.S.
Patent and
Trademark
Office, 756 F.3d
1366 (Fed. Cir.
2014)
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computer hacking
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